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The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
commissioned a group to study price-based acquisition in 1998 in a continuing effort to 
reform the Government acquisition process. Acquisition reform is intended in part to 
encourage traditionally non-Department of Defense contractors to participate in 
Department of Defense acquisitions.  The Price-based Acquisition (PBA) Study Group 
reported out in November 1999. The report defined price-based acquisition and made 
recommendations to implement PBA. One of those recommendations was to create and 
use a new contract type. The report states, “We have concluded that there is a place for a 
new contracting approach and contract type, Fixed-price, Variable Outcome. This 
approach is particularly applicable to and will allow many high-risk Science and 
Technology (S&T), risk reduction, and service contracts to be firm-fixed-price.”   
The focus of this thesis is to analyze the concept behind the Fixed-price, Variable 
Outcome (FPVO) contract type, compare the FPVO to other existing contract types, 
explore the most beneficial applications of the FPVO and finally make recommendations 
based upon the data and analysis. 
The major conclusions of this thesis are that the FPVO is an inappropriate 
contract type to be used in any Department of Defense acquisition and the basic 
objectives of the FPVO concept are still valid and worth pursuing. The FPVO contract 
type greatly increases risk of an acquisition due to the fact the contractor has control over 
the final outcome. Increasing industry participation, emulating best commercial practices, 
reducing risk for all parties concerned and achieving best value should continue to be the 
aims of acquisition reform.   The major recommendations are to abandon further 
discussion and effort to implement the FPVO contract type as presented in the PBA 
report and develop a new contract vehicle that is better able to apportion risk without 
relinquishing Government control over the outcome. Two alternatives are suggested. One 
alternative increases the dollar threshold of the FP LOE contract type and adds milestone 
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1I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
Acquisition professionals in both Government and
industry agree Government acquisition, Department of
Defense (DoD) acquisition in particular, needs improvement.
Leaders in DoD acquisition have determined Government
procurement processes and tools should mirror those found
in commercial industry. Many recommendations have been made
toward that end and pilot programs have been studied
(Ref.18,19). Pilot program successes and failures are
publicized in trade journals, reported in newspapers and
discussed at length in graduate theses. The
institutionalization of reforms is often not a criterion
for success, therefore many reform initiatives never make
the leap from success at a “center of excellence” to common
practice throughout the acquisition community. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze one reform
recommendation designed to bring DoD acquisition procedures
in concert with commercial practices. This thesis will draw
sound conclusions for the recommendation studied and offer
recommendations to further stimulate and encourage defense
acquisition reform. 
This thesis has drawn upon the knowledge and
experience of top acquisition policy makers and
practioners. It builds upon their efforts to reform defense
acquisition to encourage broader industry participation in




The broad area of research is acquisition reform.
Acquisition reform has been on the minds of acquisition
professionals, Congress and the executive branch for
roughly two decades. Considerable time and resources have
been devoted to acquisition reform with mixed results.
Several initiatives and policy course corrections have been
generated by acquisition reform such as the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990, the
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the
Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996. These Acts
resulted in changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) and altered the applicability of both the Truth in
Negotiation Act (TINA) and the Cost Accounting Standards
(CAS). 
The regulatory changes also caused acquisition
professionals to re-think the acquisition process. For many
years there was a tendency to apply the firm-fixed-price
(FFP) contract type to most situations, regardless of
whether or not it was the best type. This cookie-cutter
approach to contracting was replaced by the generic dictum
of using FFP for low-risk acquisitions and cost-
reimbursement (CR) contract vehicles for high-risk
acquisitions. As the spotlight on the acquisition community
spurred discussion and debate on re-engineering the
acquisition process to comply with the Acts, the focus
shifted from eking out the lowest cost to obtaining the
best value. 
In the interest of obtaining best value, several
initiatives were introduced. The source of the initiatives
was commercial industry. Government procurement officials
3devoted to acquisition reform determined the best practices
to emulate were those used in the commercial marketplace
(Ref.18). This conclusion makes sense in that the
commercial marketplace is subject to intense competitive
pressure and market forces. In a Darwinian sense, only the
strongest companies (those with the most efficient
procurement, production, development, etc.) will survive.
Acquisition reformers understandably looked to the
procurement strategies and practices found in successful
corporations for ideas to improve Government acquisition.
Some of the initiatives generated to synergize with
commercial best practices included abandonment of the
strict compliance with military specifications (MILSPECS),
performance (outcome) –based contracting, and price-based
acquisition (PBA)(Ref.19).
Price-based acquisition is designed to correct several
shortcomings of the traditional acquisition process
(Ref.23, p.ES-4). Foremost, PBA envisioned Government
acquisition procedures to be more commercial-like. Through
observation, surveys and research the defense acquisition
community determined leading firms in a variety of sectors
refused to participate in DoD contracts due to the
overbearing and overwhelming laws, standards and
regulations that went with such participation (Ref.19, PPCG
charter). The Government’s own procedures were entrance
barriers. These barriers effectively decreased competition,
reduced the size of the defense industrial base and
ultimately increased cost of procurement. By aligning DoD
acquisition policies and procedures with best commercial
practices, the Government sought to remove the barriers
4preventing a broader number of firms from competing for
defense contracts and drive down the cost of procurement. 
Implicit in the desire to remove barriers to entry is
the desire to reduce administrative burden and Government
oversight of contractors. PBA and other acquisition reform
initiatives seek to disengage the Government from the
contractors (e.g. limit auditors, in-plant representatives
and administrative support personnel) while at the same
time maintaining risk at an acceptable level (Ref.23, p.ES-
3). The difficulty of acquisition reformers then is to find
a mechanism to motivate contractors to participate in
defense acquisition, incentivize them to perform, mitigate
risk and accomplish all of this without excessive
oversight.
In October 1998, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), Dr.
Jacques Gansler, commissioned a group to study PBA and make
recommendations as to its use and effectiveness (Ref.20).
Specifically the group’s charter was to: 
a.Analyze the implementation of PBA in the Department
of Defense (DoD)
b.Identify specific tools and techniques to facilitate
greater use of PBA within the Department, and
c.Identify what actions will be required to transform
the Department’s buying practices into ones that are
more commercial-like (Ref.23, p. ES-3)
The Price-based Acquisition Study Group reported its
findings in the PBA Study Group Report of 15 November 1999
(Ref.23). The Group defined PBA and made many
recommendations as to its use and effectiveness in DoD
5contracting. The recommendations included evolutionary and
incremental contracting methods, renewed interest in market
research, value engineering and source selection
strategies. The Report also included a recommendation to
create and use a new contract type, the Fixed-price,
Variable Outcome (FPVO) contract (Ref.23, p.ES-9). 
The Fixed-price, Variable Outcome contract type, as
touted in the PBA report, was designed to emulate the
common practices of private industry, satisfying the third
element of the group’s charter. The FPVO contract type was
recommended as the preferred approach for all Science and
Technology (S&T) and risk-reduction contracts (Ref.23, p.
71).
C. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis examines the impetus behind the
recommendation to create a new contract type. The research
also examines the perceptions and attitudes of leaders in
the acquisition profession to discover their thoughts on
the FPVO contract type. The research defines the FPVO
contract type and compares the FPVO’s ability to reduce
risk and garner best value when compared to other existing
contract types. The researcher also examines the conditions
for use of the FPVO and acquisition situations in which the
FPVO is the optimal contract type to use.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: How might the Fixed-
price, Variable Outcome contract type be effectively used
in the process of acquiring goods and services for the
Department of Defense? The subsidiary questions are as
follows:

61.What is the FPVO contract type?
2.How is the FPVO contract the same,
similar and/or different from the
following:
a.Firm-fixed-price contracts
b.Firm-fixed-price, Level Of Effort
contracts
c.Cost Reimbursement contracts
d.Time and Materials contracts
e.Cost as an Independent Variable
(CAIV)
3.What are the prime applications for the
FPVO in DoD acquisition? 
4.What are the conditions necessary for its
use?
5.What specific recommendations can be made
to foster implementation and use?
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis focuses on creating a working definition
for the Fixed-price, Variable Outcome contract type and
determining whether or not there exists a genuine need or
desire for this new contract vehicle. In this introductory
chapter, the thesis provides relevant background
information, states the research objectives and specific
questions, and reviews the research methodology. 
7This thesis discusses the presence of risk in all
contracts and the need to mitigate that risk in Chapter II.
The FPVO contract is defined for the reader in Chapter II
and the motives behind the recommendation are discussed.
This thesis then compares the FPVO contract type concept to
existing contract types, noting the differences and
similarities of the types mentioned. This effort then
introduces the reader to the Cost as an Independent
Variable (CAIV) decision process. 
In Chapter III this thesis states the information
obtained in the research phase of the thesis process. To
ensure quality input was obtained, the researcher targeted
leaders in both the Government and civilian acquisition
communities. 
Chapter IV will break down the data presented in
Chapter III and apply the data to the issues at hand. The
researcher analyzes and frames the data to answer the
primary and secondary research questions. 
Finally in Chapter V this thesis provides sound
conclusions and recommendations based upon the data and
analysis. 
This thesis does not focus on the ability of the FPVO
contract to replace existing contract types. Potential
protests are not specifically explored due to the
tangential and speculative nature of this aspect.  This
thesis does not study past successes/failures of the FPVO
approach, as there are no good examples of the FPVO
contract’s use in its form as stated in the PBA report. 
The one significant limitation is the lack of
information. Since this contract type was first recommended
8by the PBA Team in 1999, very little has been published on
the FPVO. Feasibility studies have not been conducted on
the contract type nor have acquisition academics researched
or studied this option. As a result of this limitation, the
research is largely subjective, though the subjectivity has
been tempered by obtaining as many inputs as practicable.
The researcher assumes the reader has an interest and
basic understanding of the acquisition process. Further,
the researcher assumes the reader is familiar with
acquisition reform initiatives and terminology. The
researcher finally assumes the reader understands human
nature in that humans, particularly those whose actions are
heavily regulated and processes institutionalized, are
resistant to change.
F.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
As the FPVO contract is still in the concept stage and
no definitive field deployment information exists, the
literature available on this topic is scant. To overcome
the shortfall of written information, the researcher
queried individuals at the top of the acquisition
community. Leaders and policymakers in both Government and
commercial sectors were contacted and provided valuable
input. The participants came from the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics (USD(AT&L)), Lockheed Martin Corporation,
Northrop-Grumman Ship Systems, Raytheon and the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology. 
In addition to questionnaires and personal interviews,
the researcher utilized the information found in the Price-
based Acquisition Study Group Report, memoranda on the
9subject of acquisition reform and price-based acquisition
issued by the USD(AT&L), and other miscellaneous electronic
resources. The researcher also used the Federal Acquisition
Regulation in the comparison of the FPVO contract to
existing contracting types and drew knowledge and
information from the Contract Pricing Reference Guide
(Refs.5,6).
G. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH
This research effort will provide the necessary
information for acquisition reformers and Government
acquisition policy-makers to conclusively determine whether
the FPVO contract should be tested and implemented across
the procurement agencies or whether it is an idea that
requires no further thought or decision. At present, a gulf
exists between what decision makers know about the FPVO
contract and what they need to know to make an informed
decision. This effort will fill the gulf and either give
acquisition professionals a useful tool to reduce risk and
obtain best value or recommend reformers continue the
search for more effective commercial-like procurement
methods.
H. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This research is organized in the following way:
Chapter I introduces the reader to the topic by providing
background information. Chapter I also states the
objectives of the researcher and the research questions.
Chapter II provides background on the contracting process,
risk mitigation, and existing contracting tools. Chapter II
provides a definition of the FPVO contract type and
compares the FPVO contract to existing contracting
vehicles. Chapter III introduces the research participants
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and presents the research data collected. Chapter IV
provides the researcher’s own analysis of the data. Chapter
V states specifically the researcher's conclusions and
recommendations.
I.  CONCLUSION
 This concludes the introductory chapter. Chapter II
provides the reader with background information necessary
to place the thesis in proper context. Chapter II also
defines the Fixed-price, Variable Outcome contract type and
permits the reader to conduct a head-to-head comparison of




II. BACKGROUND, DEFINITION AND COMPARISON
A. INTRODUCTION
There is constant pressure to reform, revolutionize
and improve the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition
process. To many, there is the general perception the DoD
acquisition system is “broken” (Ref.3) and radical changes
are needed to fix the system. This general perception
persists in part due to the billions of dollars DoD spends
each year and the Congressional microscope under which the
acquisition professionals must carry out their duties
(Ref.26). 
Military and civilian leaders look to those who know
the system best to bring about change within the system.
Blue-ribbon panels and study groups are routinely
established to generate the ideas that will bring about a
revolution. 
B. BACKGROUND
To fully understand the FPVO contract type the reader
must be knowledgeable about the concept and omnipresence of
contract risk. Risk is the probability things will not
occur as planned. In the field of Government contracting,
the existence of risk means the design might not be ready
when promised, cost limitations may be exceeded, or the
item being acquired may not perform as needed or desired.
The three main types of risk for the Government are
schedule, cost and performance (Ref.5). The contractor runs
risk as well when dealing with the Government. Contractors
must be concerned with the availability of Government funds
(as approved by Congress), the contractor’s ability to
acquire raw materials and generation of revenue. 
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Risk is not a case of black and white. There are
innumerable shades of gray. The Government and the
contractor must therefore find ways to limit or mitigate
their respective risks. One of the primary means of
mitigating risk is through contract type selection (Ref.10,
p.1). The contract type agreed to by the Government and the
contractor is the starting point for mitigating and sharing
the risk so that the degree of risk is acceptable to both
parties. 
Traditionally the Government has favored the firm-
fixed-price (FFP) contract type due to its ability to
assign the majority of risk to the contractor (Ref.26).
Under a FFP contract, the contractor absorbs cost overruns.
The contractor is therefore incentivized to control costs.
Additionally, under an FFP agreement, the contractor must
deliver the goods or services for which contracted. The FFP
has other advantages for the Government. The FFP generally
entails the least administrative burden when compared to
other contract types and therefore contracts can be let
more quickly. Using the FFP contract type may negate the
need for contractor’s to demonstrate compliance with Cost
Accounting Standards (CAS)(Ref.5). 
The traditionally preferred approach is not always the
best approach. Contractors must consider their own bottom
lines when entering into a contract. It is not always in
the best self-interest of the contractor to assume the
lion’s share of risk.  At the opposite end of the spectrum
from FFP is the Cost-Reimbursement (CR) contract type.
Under a CR arrangement, the Government reimburses the
contractor for all allowable and allocable costs reasonably
incurred in the performance of the contract (Ref.6, p.337).
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Under a CR contract the contractor’s cost accounting system
must be CAS compliant for contracts over $500,000 (modified
CAS applies) and may be subject to Government audit (Ref.6,
p.623). While cost targets and share ratios exist in CR
contracts, the contractor is potentially not as
incentivized to control costs as he is under a FFP
contract, increasing the degree of cost risk borne by the
Government (Ref.26). The CR agreement requires the contract
to put forth their ‘best effort’ rather than a requirement
to deliver the goods or services for which contracted
(Ref.5).
Between the FP and CR contract types there are
variations of each contract vehicle to manipulate and
apportion the degree of risk between contracting parties.
Guidance provided in the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) directs contracting professionals to use a FP type
contract when the outcome can be well-defined and cost can
be reasonably estimated so as to determine a fair and
reasonable price (Ref.6, p.333). The FAR directs
contracting professionals to apply a CR type contract when
the outcome cannot be reasonably well-defined and a degree
of final cost uncertainty exists (Ref.6, p.337). The FAR
provides this guidance and contract type gradations to
provide contracting professionals with the ability to make
a contract type choice that has the highest possibility of
success.
DoD acquisition reformers are continually looking for
innovative approaches to contracting to further mitigate
risk, encourage a larger number of commercial firms to vie
for Government business by imitating commercial practices
and break down the barriers that continue to shrink the
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defense industrial base. Price-based acquisition (PBA) is
an approach that is making strides toward accomplishing all
of these goals. Price-based acquisition promises to reduce
Government cost risk by relying on market research,
competition, asymmetric pricing, etc., while continuing to
place importance on best value (Ref.23, ES). Price-based
acquisition, properly implemented, has the added benefit of
conforming DoD practices to commercial industry practices,
thereby tearing down barriers and encouraging broader
commercial participation (Ref.23, ES). To achieve these
objectives the PBA Study Group Report of 1999 recommended a
new contract type be added to the contracts tool bag to
recognize and apportion risk in the same way as commercial
industry.  
In particular, we believe there are major steps
DoD can take to reduce risk associated with
acquisitions by aligning DoD practices more
closely with the commercial world. For example,
within DoD, the level of perceived risk
associated with procurements significantly
affects the determination of contract type. In
contrast, contract type in the commercial sector
is a given, firm-fixed-price for most
acquisitions. Is this because the commercial
sector does not buy high-risk products? We think
not. The commercial sector structures their
purchases to use fixed-price contracting and
price-based acquisition. DoD can take a similar
approach. How can DoD increase the use of firm-
fixed-price contracts, even for major system
research and development efforts, without placing
undue risk on suppliers? By doing what a
commercial firm does – structuring the work and
using an overall acquisition approach designed to
lower risk (Ref.23, p.ES-4).
The PBA Study Group recommended a departure from
institutionalized processes that have become a part of the
DoD acquisition culture. The old paradigm of FP contracts
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for lower risk procurements and CR type contracts for
higher risk procurements was challenged. The PBA Study
Group determined a need for the Fixed-price, Variable
Outcome (FPVO) contract type. The need arose from a desire
to mirror commercial practices and reduce Government risk
for “high-risk Science and Technology (S&T), risk
reduction, and service contracts (Ref.23, p.ES-8).” The
specific recommendation appeared as follows:
We recommend USD(AT&L) issue a DoD-wide policy
making Fixed-price, Variable Outcome the
preferred approach for all S&T and risk reduction
contracts (e.g., Preliminary Design and Risk
Reduction) and other contracts where a range of
plausible outcomes is possible and acceptable.

C.  THE FIXED-PRICE, VARIABLE OUTCOME CONTRACT TYPE
1. Impetus 
So what exactly is this new contract type? Before
tackling that question, let us examine the reasons behind
the recommendation. Mr. Terry Little, a member of the PBA
Study Group, provided four main reasons for the FPVO
contract recommendation.
1. Many commercial companies decline to do
Research and Development (R&D) business with
DoD because of our penchant for cost
reimbursement contracts. Such contracts
demand certain accounting standards and many
companies understandably resent the intrusion
into their business. In today’s environment
we really need the R&D capabilities these
companies have.
2. Second reason is the infrastructure that
comes with cost reimbursement contracts—
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auditors, checkers, etc. It’s an unnecessary
cost for the Government that we pay both
directly and indirectly through overhead on
contracts.
3. Much R&D work the Government does should
really be a fixed-pricing arrangement—one
where there are incremental investment
decisions to evaluate progress and decide
whether or not to invest additional money or
cut the losses and move on to other projects.
4. Finally, budget realities often force us to
limit the monies we can spend. When we are
tightly budget constrained, but use cost
reimbursement contracts we are just being
dishonest with our contractors and ourselves
(Ref.15).
As you can see from Mr. Little’s comments, the main
impetus behind the recommendation was to foster competition
and encourage industry participation by removing barriers,
reduce Government infrastructure, impose an incremental
approach on R&D contracting and force DoD to live within
its own budget.
2. Fixed-price, Variable Outcome Defined
The Fixed-price, Variable Outcome contract type
establishes a firm-fixed-price for a product or service
that cannot be well-defined or is chosen not to be well-
defined. The requiring activity generates a range of
outcomes that are both plausible and acceptable to them.
The contractor puts forth its best effort to deliver a
product or service within the defined range but if
unsuccessful for whatever reason (barring criminal
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activity) still receives 100% of the fixed-price. It is
important to note the contractor determines the outcome
under the FPVO contract based upon funding and the range
established (researcher’s own definition).
To further clarify, the FPVO contract is dependent
upon a decision maker or decision process to determine the
value of the acquisition (Ref.23, p.71). The amount of
payment to the contractor is fixed. The outcome ideally
should be within a range of plausible outcomes as defined
by the requiring activity. The FPVO contract does not
define a specific objective or outcome nor does it require
the contractor to deliver. “The degree of success does not
determine payment, full payment occurs whether the effort
succeeds 110% or 0% (Ref.15).” “The FPVO concept presumes
that, within the total amount of funds available, what the
contractor actually does is a ‘best effort’ geared toward
achieving a mutually agreeable goal (Ref.23, p.72).” The
PBA report provides the following illustration.
Imagine that you have an aging automobile with
several mechanical problems. Your goal is to get
as many of the problems fixed as possible, but
you only have $500 to spend on repairs. You know
that this is not enough to fix everything. You go
to a mechanic and describe the symptoms of the
problems. You also tell the mechanic you have a
$500 limit. You tell him that you may come back
and fix the remainder of the problems when you
have more money to spend provided that you are
satisfied with what he has done (Ref.23, p.72). 
Not reflected in the illustration is the objective of
imposing an incremental approach. Mr. Little expounded on
this aspect as follows: “Once he (the car owner) sees the
result he may decide to a) invest no more money in the car
and live with it like it is, b) invest another increment of
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money, or; c) sell the car (Ref.15).” The PBA report
provided two additional examples shown in Appendix B
(Ref.23, pp.M-1, M-2).
It should be noted the requirement to pay the
contractor the full amount regardless of the success of the
outcome adds the firm-fixed-price element to the FPVO
contract. A descriptively accurate name for the proposed
contract type, based upon the wording of the PBA report and
supplemental information obtained, is the Firm-fixed-price,
Variable Outcome (FFPVO) contract. While FFPVO is more
descriptively accurate, this thesis will maintain the
conventional FPVO acronym established in the PBA report.
D.  COMPARISON OF FPVO CONTRACT AND OTHER CONTRACT TYPES
The FPVO contract is a type of FP contract. The
recommended applications of the FPVO contract are “for
fixed-price purchases of engineering services, maintenance,
studies, research, risk reduction, and other activities
where the procurement is essentially an investment and
results other than a well-defined end product are
acceptable (Ref.23, p.71).” The inclusion of “risk
reduction” broadens the recommendation to apply to
virtually every contract in which the parties attempt to
reduce or mitigate their own risk. The recommendation to
create an entirely new contract type begs the question
“What will a FPVO contract give me that I did not have
before?” At this point a comparison of the FPVO contract
with existing contract types is appropriate (An at-a-glance
comparison is offered in Appendix E.).
1.  FPVO Compared to FFP
Firm-fixed-price contracts establish a single price
for the goods or services being procured that are not
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subject to adjustment based upon actual costs experienced
by the contractor (Ref.6, p.333). As stated previously, the
contractor bears the preponderance of cost, schedule and
performance risk under an FFP arrangement. The FFP contract
type maximizes the contractor’s incentive to control costs.
Under an FFP arrangement, every dollar the contractor saves
is an additional dollar of profit (Ref.13). 
The FFP contract type is typically used to acquire
commercial goods and services when the outcome is
reasonably defined and/or definitive functional or detailed
specifications exist (Ref.6, p.333). As with all contracts,
the contracting officer must be able to establish a fair
and reasonable price to apply a FFP contract.
The FFP contract requires the contractor to deliver
the supplies or services for which contracted. The
administrative burden to the Government is the lowest under
a pure FFP arrangement. The FFP, as described in the FAR,
is not for use in high-risk R&D contracts (Ref.6, p.333).
Like the pure FFP contract type, the FPVO contract
also establishes a single price (non-adjustable) for the
goods or services for which contracted. Again, like the FFP
contract the FPVO contract may be used for commercial
items, such as aircraft engine repair, but it may also
apply to non-commercial R&D efforts.   Unlike FFP
contracts, the contractor does not assume the majority of
risk in an FPVO arrangement. Relieving the requirement on
the contractor to deliver an outcome and allowing the
contractor to determine the outcome alters the risk
equation, bringing more risk on the side of Government. 
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The FPVO contract does not require the outcome to
comply with strict specifications nor does it require the
outcome be reasonably defined up front (Ref.23, p.71). The
FPVO contract does call for establishment of a range of
outcomes that are both plausible and acceptable. This range
of outcomes serves as a target or boundary for the
contractor’s efforts.  As stated in the FPVO contract
definition section, the contractor is not required to
furnish an outcome within the range of outcomes but is
required to give its best effort. The contractor can
receive full payment under a FPVO contract even though its
best effort was unsuccessful. This is in sharp contrast to
the FFP contract where the contractor is paid only upon
delivery.
2.  FPVO Compared to Fixed-price, Level Of Effort (FP
LOE)
The FPVO has many more similarities with the FP LOE
than with the FFP. The FP LOE contract type requires the
contractor to “provide a specified level of effort, over a
stated period of time” (Ref.6, p.337) on work that is not
well-defined. As it is still in the FFP family, the dollar
amount is established at the beginning of the relationship. 
The FP LOE contract type is only applicable to R&D
efforts and other efforts where a topic is being
investigated with unknown outcomes (Ref.6, p.337). As with
the FPVO, the contractor can receive full payment of the
fixed amount regardless of whether or not the outcome is
declared a success: the “payment is based on the effort
expended rather than on the results achieved (Ref.6,
p.337).” Due to this arrangement, the Government bears the
burden of performance risk but tempers the cost risk by
setting a dollar value limitation.
21
The FP LOE contract has strict limitations that
constrain its applicability. Those limitations are:
(a) The work required cannot otherwise be clearly
defined (as with FPVO)
(b) The required level of effort is identified and
agreed upon in advance (in contrast with FPVO)
(c) There is reasonable assurance that the intended
result cannot be achieved by expending less than
the stipulated effort; and
(d) The contract price is $100,000 or less, unless
approved by the chief of the contracting office
(Ref.6, p.337).
3.  FPVO Compared to Cost-reimbursement Contracts
The primary tenet of CR contracts is the Government
reimburses the contractor for all allowable and allocable
costs reasonably incurred up to a cost ceiling. To be
allowable the cost charged to the Government must meet CAS
(if CAS applies) and to be allocable the contractor must be
able to show the Government how and where the money was
spent under specific accounting controls subject to CAS and
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)(Ref.26).
The CR contract type family may allow Government auditors
to review company accounting systems, CAS compliance and
closely monitor contractor performance, which may not be
required under a fixed-price type contract.
The CR contracts are currently used when it is
difficult or impossible to determine the cost of an
acquisition at the time of contract (Ref.6, p.337). This
condition most often occurs when the requirement cannot be
clearly defined, just as with the FPVO contract. Under CR
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contracts the Government holds the lion’s share of all
three risk categories, cost, schedule and performance. The
contractor is required to put forth a best effort, just as
with FPVO contract, and will receive some level of payment
based upon that effort. In contrast to the FPVO contract,
there is no stipulation the contractor receive the full
amount for the effort, only that they receive all allowable
and allocable costs.
In sharp contrast to FP contracts, CR contracts are
prohibited from use in the acquisition of commercial items.
Also in contrast is the contractor’s incentive to control
costs. Where the FP contract promotes and rewards
efficiency, the CR contract type permits cost escalation
provided costs are allowable and allocable.
The requirement in CR contracts for auditors, checkers
and monitors increases the administrative burden for both
the contractor and the Government over FP contract types.
As noted above, an impetus behind the FPVO concept is to do
away with such infrastructure. 
Limitations of the CR contract type have been
mentioned but will be listed below for clarity:
(a) A cost-reimbursement contract may be used only
when-
(1) The contractor’s accounting system is
adequate for determining costs applicable to
the contract; and
(2) Appropriate Government surveillance during
performance will provide reasonable assurance
that efficient methods and effective cost
controls are used.
23
(b) The use of cost-reimbursement contracts is
prohibited for the acquisition of commercial
items (Ref.6, p.337).
It should be noted that the FAR makes the important
distinction that CR contracts should only be used when
“uncertainties involved in contract performance do not
permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to
use any type of fixed-price contract (italics added)(Ref.6,
p.337).” The FAR clearly shows a preference for fixed-price
type contracts over CR type contracts.
4.  FPVO Contracts Compared to Time and Materials
(T&M) Contracts
The Time and Materials contract type is included in
this section because of the crossover of both FP and CR
contracts into the T&M area. The T&M contract type is used
to acquire commercial goods or services and fixes an
element of the final cost, such as hourly wage rate (Ref.6,
p.351). The variable costs are most often the cost of
material and material handling. The illustration used to
explain the FPVO was that of a car in a mechanic’s repair
shop. If the reader has ever had an auto repaired, he or
she will remember the mechanic worked at a fixed hourly
rate and the material or parts required for the repair
appeared as separate line items on the bill. 
As with the FPVO, a ceiling, or “do not exceed” price
is established at the time of the contract. Similar to the
FPVO, under a T&M contract situation it is not possible to
determine the duration of the effort or total cost. This
uncertainty breeds risk. The risk in a T&M contract is
primarily the Government’s. The contractor is rewarded for
costly parts and many labor hours as long as he remains
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under the price ceiling. To mitigate this risk, the
Government must expend resources to monitor the contractor. 
 Just as with the FPVO contract, the contractor under
a T&M contract arrangement must exert his best effort in
the performance of the contract. The contractor will
receive payment based upon hours expended and materials
used that are verifiable and under the price ceiling. There
is no guarantee the contractor will receive the price-
ceiling amount.
The T&M contract type has some strict limitations. It
is clearly a type to use as a last resort. T&M may be used
(Ref.6, p.351)
(a) only after the contracting officer executes a
determination and findings that no other
contract type is suitable; and
(b) only if the contract includes a ceiling price
that the contractor exceeds at his own risk.
E.  COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (CAIV)
The PBA report describes the FPVO strategy as a
variant of Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) (Ref.23,
p.72). CAIV is a decision process rather than a contract
type and as of January 2001 has not been mentioned in the
FAR. While CAIV has been widely written about and
discussed, many of those involved in the daily work of
acquisition are unfamiliar with both the term and the
concept. CAIV has been defined as follows:
A multi-faceted management approach to planning
for, designing, manufacturing and sustaining best
value systems that meet warfighter needs
(Ref.27).
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Though many missed the proclamation, CAIV is a
defense-wide policy (Ref.27). Conceptually, CAIV fixes
costs and emphasizes trade-offs among performance
characteristics of an acquisition (Ref.8). 
CAIV allows an affordability evaluation to be
made of the various supportability approaches and
choices among reliability, maintainability and
supportability options to reflect program
objectives and thresholds (Ref.8).
For example, a new rifle is in development for DoD and
the requiring activity desires a certain weight, muzzle
velocity, reliability, and effective range. CAIV analysis
is performed in the systems engineering process and the
trade-off decisions become part of the requirements
document. Both actual contractor performance and schedule
are dependent upon the funds available (Ref.8). Under CAIV,
those responsible for developing the requirements document
maintain control of the outcome by making trade-off
decisions prior to the source selection process.  Best
value does not mean highest cost; rather it means greatest
capability and reliability for the money spent. 
The CAIV approach is similar to the FPVO approach in
that it looks to incrementalize the acquisition process and
make decisions based on fixed resources. CAIV is again
similar to FPVO in that it supports best value by requiring
trade-offs. In FPVO, the trade-offs occur within the range
of plausible and acceptable outcomes. In the CAIV
philosophy, the range is not expressly stated but present
just the same.
The differences between the two are fairly clear. CAIV
is not a contract type but rather could be used in
conjunction with a FP or CR type contract. CAIV is already
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a defense-wide policy and has been used on high-level
programs such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)(Ref.27). 
The CAIV philosophy emphasizes integrated teams much
more so than does the FPVO recommendation (Refs.8,27). The
FPVO contract is recommended primarily as a tool for
contracting officers while CAIV is an acquisition strategy
designed to foster ownership of cost, schedule and
performance by every individual involved in the acquisition
(Ref.27).
F.  CONCLUSION
This chapter highlights the similarities and
differences between the FPVO contract type and the contract
vehicles already listed in the FAR. The FPVO contract draws
upon key elements of FFP, FP LOE, CR and T&M contracts in
an attempt to capitalize upon the strengths of each, while
leaving the weaknesses of each behind. The aim of the FPVO
contract type is to decrease cost risk to the Government by
virtue of the fixed-price element while simultaneously
reducing cost risk through an incremental strategy. Mr.
Little of the PBA study Group stated FPVO “should replace
cost reimbursement contracts for many applications
(Ref.15).”
I have also introduced the CAIV philosophy to the
reader to highlight the similarity between the FPVO as
recommended and an existing defense-wide acquisition
policy. 
G.  SUMMARY
Chapter II provides important background data for
understanding the defense acquisition environment, in
particular the risks involved, and for understanding the
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genesis of the FPVO recommendation. Chapter II defines the
FPVO contract for the reader, provides examples and
highlights similarities and differences between the FPVO
contract and other contract vehicles.
Chapter III introduces the research study participants
to the reader and presents the information derived from

















This section introduces the research participants. To
obtain the highest quality responses the researcher
solicited information from people at the highest levels of
defense acquisition. The five respondents answered
questions formulated to determine: (1) the applicability of
the FPVO concept; (2) the impact the FPVO contract might
have on the risk equation if implemented, and; (3) what the
FPVO concept does in the context of acquisition reform. 
B. INTRODUCTION OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
The research participants are:
Ms. Deidre Lee, Director, Defense Procurement,
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
Ms. Judith Blake, Senior Procurement Analyst,
Headquarters Department of the Army, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition
Logistics and Technology, Acquisition Reform
Directorate
*Please note Ms. Blake’s opinions are her own and
not the official position of the U. S. Army
Eugene Harshbarger, RADM (Ret), USN, Director,
Acquisition Policy, Northrop-Grumman Ship Systems
Mr. Richard Foley, Vice President – Contracts,
Raytheon Company
Mr. Scott Parry, Corporate Director, Contract
Policy, Lockheed Martin Corporation

C.  PRESENTATION OF DATA
The section that follows is presented in the form of
the questions asked and responses received. For simplicity,
the following format will be used to indicate the
participant providing the response: (DL) for Deidre Lee,
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(JB) for Judith Blake, (EH) for RADM Harshbarger, (RF) for
Richard Foley and (SP) for Scott Parry. 
The researcher has presented the responses to the
questions that are most relevant and added value to the
research. A complete list of questions is provided in
Appendix C. Some questions have been rephrased from their
original form for clarity. The meaning and intent of the
rephrased questions has been kept intact. The interview
with Ms. Lee was conducted over the telephone. The
researcher has added words to her responses for grammar and
flow while attempting to the maintain integrity of her
responses. All other interviews were conducted via
electronic mail. 
1. Do you think there is a genuine desire to move
away from cost-reimbursement contract types
whenever possible?
(DL)  From a Government standpoint, yes. The
desire is to appropriately manage risk. We must
determine the best way to manage risk for the
Government and the contractor.
(JB) On the part of leadership there is a very
strong desire to move away from cost-
reimbursement contracts. Contractors are, in my
experience, more reluctant. Both fixed-price and
cost contracts have their own set of problems in
administration. It should be noted that the
Inspector General and the General Accounting
Office are somewhat conservative, and are moving
toward an even greater conservatism. They are
recently raising significant concerns about the
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lack of certified cost and pricing data and using
price analysis alone to determine price
reasonableness. They feel that some price-based
actions may not have considered fully the value
equation such that the taxpayer is protected.
(EH) There has always been a desire to avoid
cost-type contracts because of the uncertainty of
required funding. This, however, should not be
the driver for decision-making. If a fixed-price
type contract is used where the work scope is not
well-defined, the normal result is difficult
contract administration and a high likelihood of
claims and/or unsatisfactory performance.
(RF) Current budget limitations are in effect
causing cost type contracts to be implemented as
fixed; accordingly a move to fixed price is
desirable. However, both contract deliverables
and customer expectations must clearly be
flexible goals.
(SP) No, I think there is a desire to move away
from cost-reimbursement contracts whenever
“appropriate.”
2. Have you heard of the FPVO concept before? If so,
what was your exposure to the concept?
(DL) The concept is not new but the name is. It
is similar to fixed-price research and
development which has never been widely
practiced.
(JB) Yes. This FPVO concept is not entirely new
and various aspects of it are even reflected
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within existing regulations. Note also that
“CAIV” or “Cost as an Independent Variable”
focuses very heavily on funding limitations and
trade space within technical requirements to
achieve maximum value for available dollars.
(EH) I was not aware of it before you brought it
to my attention and I read the PBA report.
(RF) Yes. My only exposure has been in concept
development studies.
(SP) Yes, I participated in the PBA study effort.
3. The FPVO contract type was recommended as a
contracting reform initiative in 1999. Why do you
think it is still in the concept phase? Why do
you think acquisition initiatives in general are
difficult to implement?
(DL) There are several reasons. Competing
initiatives, such as performance-based
contracting, overshadowed other recommendations.
The top has an ‘ivory tower’ mentality that does
not reflect the reality in the field. Those in
the field want to follow policy. Training,
education, expectations and communication,
communication, communication are needed to invoke
change.
(JB) This action (FPVO recommendation) was not
taken – and while I cannot speak to the reason
for this, I believe it to be at least partly as a
result of significant disagreement on the panel
who prepared the PBA report – to such an extent
that the report was issued with a cover sheet
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stating the principals did not agree with the
entire content.
Attorneys especially often recommend against
breaking new ground; I frequently hear “we have
no experience with this” as a reason not to
implement new procedures. Contracting officers
and attorneys are fond of using the ‘60-Minutes’
test-an assessment of how a certain action would
look in the evening news media bent on protecting
the taxpaying public.
(EH)  It has limited applicability. (Culture) is
resistant to change, comfort in using what worked
in the past.
(RF) Has not been acted upon because of the
paradigm of a customer requiring a fixed amount
of services or supplies for a fixed price has
been too hard to overcome.
(SP) It (FPVO) has not been acted upon because it
was recognized as the sham that it is. I think
the three primary reasons reforms are difficult
to implement are: (1) the initiatives are ill
conceived and thus face resistance from those
that recognize their inherent flaws; (2) inertia
– change is difficult to stimulate when it
challenges the construct within which the
workforce has achieved success, especially when
it is not adequately demonstrated that there is a
burning need to change; and (3) concerns about
job security – change often means displacement of
workers as they are made obsolete or redundant,
and absent some assurance that they can continue
34
to participate meaningfully in the changed
environment, there is resistance.
4. Do you have a contract now or have you had a
contract in the past where the FPVO would have
been applicable and its use desired? If so, what
was the nature of the procurement?
(DL) The concept has been used before without the
name. It has been used on smaller programs. NASA
has used a fixed amount for R&D. May also have a
“fixed-price concept demonstration.”
(JB) The examples are endless.  I’ll give you two
simplistic examples that are a bit different from
those in the report -- 
One, a case in which a military command desired
to train its military staff and to have
accredited private post-graduate institutions
grant a master’s degree in International Studies
that would give credit to students for certain
military classes they were required to take. 
Only a performance based and variable outcome
contract would suffice, since each accredited
institution had its own requirements, course
list, and course content, and must follow those
in order to maintain its accreditation.  The fee
per student was clearly amenable to fixed-price
structure, on similar terms to other students of
the institution.
Another is total ownership cost (TOC) reduction
initiatives – fixed-price contracts might be
awarded to encourage TOC reduction, in which
contractors would be paid a fixed amount to
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initiate and implement changes that would result
in increased reliability, maintainability, or
commonality.  These might be approached as value
engineering, but typically the value engineering
change proposal (VECP) process is lengthy and
often viewed as ineffective or onerous by all
parties.  A FPVO contract would be a good
substitute.  
(EH)  Not in Northrop-Grumman Ship Systems
(RF) Unknown
(SP) Sure, we could have used it, but it would
have provided no real enhancement to the existing
repertoire of contract types.
5. Do you think the FPVO could be used successfully
in performance-based contracting and performance-
based service contracting?
(DL) Think about how you spend your own money. If
you were the one seeking goods or services you
would be unlikely to get what is required or
desired if you can’t define the result you want
sufficiently.
(JB) In concept, performance-based contracts are
outcome-based contracts.  If the focus is on
outcome, then a FPVO contract is certainly
appropriate as offerors should have different
solutions, methods, and so on.   The FPVO
approach is almost by definition outcome-focused.  
(EH) Possibly, but with limited applicability.
(RF) Not until customer expectations at all
levels are aligned with clearly identified
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variable requirements.  Conversely, clear
measurement of the contractor’s performance
against the identified variable requirements is
necessary.
(SP) It can be used no more successfully than
could some less contrived form of contract.  You
are no more assured of a worthwhile result when
using FPVO than you would be in using a cost
reimbursable type of contract.
6. Do you think the FPVO would require more
Government monitoring than CR type contracts, the
same amount, or less monitoring?
(DL) We buy staff work using FPVO, both
Government civilian and military employees (Ms.
Lee gave the insightful comment that we hire
people at a fixed price and the outcome per
individual varies widely). The extent of
monitoring required is unclear.
(JB) In the famous words of all Government
contracting – “It Depends.”  I believe you will
have a range of monitoring needs based on
different contract requirements.  In some
instances, the difference between FPVO and cost
reimbursable may lie not in how much monitoring
is required, but in who does the monitoring.   We
would expect to see a significant reduction in
oversight of the accounting processes, but by the
same token, we might see an increase in claims,
modifications, change proposals, and so on, all
of which take a significant level of
administrative effort. I think an important
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element that is sometimes neglected by proponents
of PBA is that a prudent contractor may feel he
can maximize his overall profits on Government
contracts by establishing a separate Government
business unit with a cost-accounting standards
compliant accounting system.  The reason for this
is that when a claim, change order, or
modification is necessary, the notion of
“allowable cost” comes into play for determining
the value of such orders.  Where a non-compliant
system exists certain costs the company includes
in its business records would have to be
identified and excluded from the negotiation of
value.   Additionally, the Government is keenly
interested in assuring that it pays reasonable
prices – for oversight agencies like the GAO,
this often equates to assuring that the
Government does not bear a disproportionate share
of company costs through what we would
traditionally consider inappropriate pricing
mechanisms or allocations of overheads.   There
is often a thin line between “what the market
will bear” and “gouging” when one thinks of
fairness in pricing strategies.
(EH) It should require less, but in practice will
probably require more Government involvement due
to what is really a cost-type scope of work.  The
PM will probably not be willing to simply stand
by while the contractor proceeds with a scope of
work the PM doesn’t consider will meet the
program needs.
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(RF) Initially it may require the same amount of
monitoring; however, over time should go down.
(SP) About the same.
7. What incentives do you think are required for the
FPVO to be used successfully (provided you think
it can be used successfully)? 
(DL) The concept has been used. Incentives would
have to satisfy requirements for risk. Concept
won’t work for products or services unless it is
for pure augmentation services.
(JB) Incentives are an interesting concept.  As
the report noted, contract structure (such as
performance based payments) can be an effective
element of incentive.  Competition, where
effective, is always a motivator; hope of future
contracts is probably the strongest, but leads to
some difficulties with the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984 as amended.  The hope of
future contracts rests on the premise that future
contracts might not be competitive (and thus more
lucrative and/or less costly to obtain).  The
Government might find itself in a sole-source
situation in which it had less bargaining power
and thus was unable to obtain the best pricing
and terms on the follow-on contracts.  Ideally,
competition should be maintained as long as
possible in the process, since it is arguably one
of the best motivators toward desirable outcomes
for the Government.  
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If FPVO is not abused to result in contracts
for which the Government pays money to achieve
little or no result, then I believe they can be
used successfully.  There is a danger that it can
be used as a way to escape writing a well-
crafted, well thought-out contract using existing
procedures, however.  As a concept, sometimes it
is desirable to put a “tag” on a thought process
that will enable learners to categorize a
procedure.  Such a “tag” can give a new procedure
or process legitimacy, and once it enters a
common body of knowledge, it is more easily used.
(EH) As you can tell by my prior comments, I have
strong reservations about the effectiveness of
FPVO.
(RF) Performance based payments are not suitable
since this could become a tool to force
contractor to do more than required.  Monetary
incentives for amount of work accomplished or
higher ratings for future competitions would be a
constructive incentive.
(SP) Why would the Government want to perpetrate
a fraud on the public by maintaining that it is
using fixed-price contracting, shifting the risk
equation in favor of the Government, when there
is not a fixed outcome?  The incentives provided
to a contractor under this arrangement would be
no more or less effective than those that could
be provided in a cost-type environment.  If you
provide performance-based payments, you suddenly
move into an environment where the outcome is not
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really as variable as you might think because the
performance events will dictate a level of
performance that may or may not be achievable –
increasing a contractor’s risk significantly.
8. What rules, regulations and/or statutes would
need to change to successfully begin using the
FPVO throughout the DoD acquisition community?
(DL) No rules would need to change. You would
need to focus more on requirements; how do you
price the outcome?
(JB) I believe we currently have authority to use
FPVO.  Adding a discussion of FPVO and parameters
to the Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 16
could be beneficial.  Traditional problems with
all Government contracts exist that impede
ability to implement totally commercial
practices, such as the Service Contract Act
requiring payment of certain base wage levels and
associated requirement for Government insight and
oversight of wages.   There are others, from TINA
to CICA to socioeconomic programs.   The whole
issue of “fair and reasonable price” is
problematic where our notion of a contract is
that we may get nothing for our money -- an
unacceptable outcome for contracting officers,
attorneys, oversight agencies, and taxpayers.  
There is also longstanding resistance in many
contracting communities to releasing Government
estimates of price to competing contractors. 
While a real prohibition does not exist, the
strictures of the Procurement Integrity Act have
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been so ingrained in procurement staff members
that there is a strong resistance to disclosure
of such information.   Thus, the concept of FPVO
and, in some instances, even CAIV can meet with
unexpected and unwarranted resistance.
(EH) Nothing I can think of.  The key to
successful use of FPVO is a PM that will keep
hands off in contract administration and a
willingness to defend that whatever result
obtained was a prudent use of the funds.
(RF) I cannot think of any that would have to be
changed.  Retraining in writing contracts and
measuring a contractors’ performance against the
variable requirements would be necessary.  Most
importantly a cultural change is essential.
(SP) Don’t see this as a statutory issue, but you
would have to change Part 16.
9. The three scenarios (see Appendix D.) are
examples of procurements in which it is suggested
the FPVO should be used in place of CR types or
other FP contracts. If the FPVO were an option,
would you use it in these or similar
acquisitions? If not, please state reasons why.
(DL)  Based upon previous responses this question
was not asked of Ms. Lee.
(JB) Example 1 – Unmanned Air Ordnance Delivery
System (UAODS) – The FPVO contract is only one
option that could be considered in this scenario.  
Another potential method would be a “tournament”
contract in which the same pool of money is
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posted as a payment for a design and prototype
(especially when there is already a significant
body of research and a number of products in
production given similar existing technology).  
The prototype that works best gets the prize and
the potential for a contract.  
Example 2 – Pierside Restricted Availability
(PRAV) - This is, it seems to me, an appropriate
application of FPVO.  The more traditional
approach would be a competitive best value
dissimilar competition in which we provide
priorities to competing contractors, obtain
offers, negotiate the work to be included within
and monitor.  However, this can be problematic
since repair contracts frequently bring to light
problems that were not previously obvious.  Thus,
the FPVO is more likely to result in completion
of the maximum portion of the necessary work
within that budget amount.  Oversight by
knowledgeable technical staff to assure value
would be crucial.   Putting this effort within a
larger context would be ideal.  Multiple awards
for similar work could be made, with the
contracts set up so that the repair contractors
would be measured on their productiveness,
quality and value provided for investment. 
Future work would then be awarded based on this
performance rating under the contracts.    In the
old days, simplified purchase procedures used a
similar technique – called a “not to exceed”
order, in which a value was provided in the
award, and the contractor could do the work and
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bill an amount UP TO but not in EXCESS OF that
amount.  
Example 3 – Consultant Services - We are talking
about using in excess of two person-years of
effort for this research, well over half million
dollars, assuming a per-hour fully loaded payment
to the consultant of $150.  I would be unlikely
to use FPVO in the way you suggest for these
services since the likelihood of significant
duplication of effort seems to me to be wasteful.  
(EH) UAODS – you don’t need to create a new form
of contract for this scenario.  It’s been used
many times in the past but may not be acceptable
currently because of the USD (AT&L) policy
against requiring contractors to make company
investments in developing DOD programs.  The
scenario would likely lead to the contractors
making IR&D investments to supplement the NAVAIR
funding.  Rather than a report, I would recommend
the deliverable be a fully priced production
proposal.
Mine Countermeasures Support Ship (MCS)-12 – The
FPVO contract would work but again you don’t need
a new form of contract.  Individual repair items
can be individually fixed-priced by the repair
yard and the Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP)
negotiates the FFP.  
Consultants – FPVO would work but why not use a
standard FFP.  As long as the consultants are
carefully selected, the deliverable should be
satisfactory.
44
(RF) It is not clear that it could be used in
Example #2.  Consideration must be given to the
complexity of the individual repairs along with
the number of repairs accomplished.  A monetary
incentive would be appropriate.
(SP) No because your scenarios are basically
flawed:  #1 is just another means of forcing
contractor investment (in order to potentially
secure follow-on work) in programs in
contravention of USD(AT&L) memo of 16 May 01
(Ref.21); #2 If it were really true that the
requirer would be happy with whatever gets done,
you would not need a fixed-price instrument; #3
Why split effort between two firms in this
scenario when a competition beforehand could
select the best qualified and allow that firm to
expend all the money in producing a viable study
– rather than having each perform essentially the
same effort for half the money?
10. Do you think a contractor and the Government
could agree upon a fixed-price for these types of
procurements?
(DL) Based upon previous responses this question
was not asked of Ms. Lee.
(JB) As a general note, I am always astonished at
what we can get contractors to sign up to. 
Sometimes, they sign up to an agreement, and rely
upon ambiguities to assure that they can “get
well” through changes.  Other times, we may get
them to agree to a fixed price, but that price is
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inordinately high and would be unacceptable.  In
a FPVO environment, however – the risk is the
Government’s since a usable product is not really
part of the requirement.  In addition, using what
we consider to be a poor quality product or low
level of effort as adverse past performance in
the future may be problematic, since we enter the
contract with the notion that the outcome need
not be useful or the amount of repair to be done
is at the contractor’s discretion.
(EH) Yes, but For UAODS the USD (AT&L) policy
could be a problem.
(RF) Yes, except for Example # 2.  See comments
in answer 11 for my concerns. (It is not clear
that it could be used in Example #2 consideration
must be given to the complexity of the individual
repairs along with the number of repairs
accomplished.  A monetary incentive would be
appropriate.)
(SP) Sure, show me the money!  But, do you really
want a contractor to price in all sorts of
contingencies in order to achieve a fixed-price
for effort that should be priced in some manner
that allows a less conservative approach to
pricing?
11. How effectively do you think the FPVO would
mitigate cost and performance risk in the
scenarios?
(DL) Based upon previous responses this question
was not asked of Ms. Lee.
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(JB) Example 1 – (UAODS) Cost risk should
decrease somewhat; performance risk would
increase.
Example 2 - (PRAV) Cost risk significantly
reduce; performance risk could increase
marginally since we do not have insight into the
effort expended and would need highly
knowledgeable technical oversight.
Example 3 – (Consultant Services) Assuming we
have the right dollar value on the effort, cost
risk would be somewhat reduced, but I believe
performance risk would increase – the quality of
end product could decline and generate additional
contract administration arguments – for example,
whether the Government was providing needed
information or the information was in an
unforeseen location using up lots of funds on
travel.
(EH) If in fact the PM is willing to let the
contractor proceed without Government
involvement/interference it might work. 
(RF) It would be very effective in mitigating
both; however, one must understand that the
customer needs may be less than satisfied.
(SP) Risk on whose part?  Inappropriate use of
fixed-price contracts increases contractor risk,
even in a variable outcome situation because
expectations are different in a fixed-price
environment.  FPVO would technically bind both
the price and the risk, but the risk of not
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obtaining a useful product will still exist for
the Government.
12. Do you think the contractor’s best effort would
satisfy the Government’s goals/desires?
(DL) Based upon previous responses this question
was not asked of Ms. Lee.
(JB) If best effort was provided by a contractor,
and assuming that the Government expectations
relate to reality, yes.  
(EH) Possibly, but I can’t visualize a PM not
getting involved if he doesn’t like the
prospective outcome.
(RF) The customer goals/desires may not be
satisfied unless the customer has accepted the
changes in culture needed (i.e., acceptance of
other than a complete accomplishment of
requirements).
(SP) Might or might not.  Most contractors will
be eager to satisfy the Government’s needs, but
their best efforts may not be good enough.
13. One of the advantages of the FPVO is that the
fixed-price eliminates the baggage that comes
with CR contracts such as auditors, checkers,
etc. Do you think this is true? If true, is this
a good thing?
(DL)  You still have politics, Congress,
taxpayers and protests. Auditors are needed in
this environment.
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(JB) Yes, I would agree that a fixed-price
eliminates much cost-accounting baggage.  It
often adds to other oversight problems, such as
an increased need for incentive arrangements and
it certainly does not reduce the need for
technical involvement.  Some work effort may move
from administration to contract formation – where
there is greater need for information, creative
contract structure, and detailed negotiation of
expectations, assessment of work effort and
structuring requirements in outcome-based terms,
and resolution of ambiguities in documents.
(EH) With respect to auditors it’s probably true. 
As noted above, because of the nature of the
work, the likelihood of extensive PM involvement,
whether permitted by the contract or not, is
high.
(RF) With respect to auditors it’s probably true. 
As noted above, because of the nature of the
work, the likelihood of extensive PM involvement,
whether permitted by the contract or not, is
high.
(SP) Not necessarily true.  It is very likely
that the program office will have to substitute
its own oversight in ensuring that it is getting
value for its money.
14. What do you perceive are the strengths and
weaknesses of the FPVO?
(DL) Weaknesses are definition of requirements
(Government is unclear as to what it is after)
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and obligating funds for which there is no remedy
for poor performance. The one strength is that it
is easy use.
(JB) FPVO recognizes constraints of price.  In
fact, one might almost call it “Price as an
Independent Variable” contracting if one extended
the CAIV idea.  We are essentially buying the
maximum value we can for a stated fixed-price. 
This focus on price up front, if handled well,
can lead to useful dialogue and open
communication.  To the extent that outcomes are
poorly defined there is a danger that the effort
will lack direction and, therefore, purpose. 
Outcomes are best measured when there is a goal
in mind.
(EH) Weaknesses – as noted in the responses
above, previous attempts to force not well-
defined work scopes into a fixed-price
environment have generally not worked.
(RF) Strengths – Contractors will focus on the
critical requirements they can accomplish for the
dollars. Weakness – The customer may not get
everything they wanted.
(SP) As already indicated, FPVO is a sham that
serves no identifiable purpose other than to
allow the parties to indicate that they are
operating in a fixed-price environment. 
D.  CONCLUSION
Each of the high-level acquisition community members
participating in this research effort provides a slightly
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different assessment of the FPVO concept from the others.
The common thread is that all five participants looked at
the FPVO concept with skepticism as to its applicability
and utility. 
Each participant was provided with the opportunity to
offer any additional comments on the FPVO concept they
thought necessary. Here is what they had to say:
(DL) There is no room for the FPVO (in Government
contracting)
(JB) One of the things that concerns me about
FPVO contracts is an external environment
requiring not only results from contracts, but
also positive results.  In an FPVO environment
where one potential outcome is a negative one
(the project is shelved since it is not feasible,
for example) there is a taint of “failure” on the
project and on the Service that supported the
project.  Congressional funding is often
predicated on “success”; GAO oversight of
contract spending revels in identifying “waste”
or taxpayer dollars ill spent.  In this
environment a tacit recognition that “best
effort” might not result in “success” is likely
to be politically detrimental to a program.
(EH) As you can tell I have a decided lack of
enthusiasm for the FPVO type of contract.  In
limited situations it might be beneficial, but in
my experience attempts to fit cost-type scopes of
work into fixed-price contracts end up being
contract administration nightmares.  I suggest
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you research very thoroughly the literature an on
selection of form of contract.  My recollection
is that for fixed pricing you need a definitive
scope of work.  If a pricing review doesn’t
indicate fixed-pricing is appropriate, don’t try
to force the work into an inappropriate form of
contract and call it “acquisition reform.”
(RF) None
(SP) If it is not already apparent, I am not a
fan of FPVO.  If risk is so great that a cost-
type approach is appropriate, use it!  If not,
use a truly fixed price instrument.
It should be recalled that one of the impetuses behind
the FPVO concept, PBA and acquisition reform itself is to
make current Government practices more like those used
between commercial firms. The negative perceptions and
sentiment toward a concept that began with the noble ideal
of intelligent acquisition reform is to say the least
surprising.
E.  SUMMARY
This chapter presented the information as it was
received from the study participants. The next chapter
analyzes these data and applies the analysis to the issues
of FPVO contract type applicability, role in acquisition



































IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides the researcher’s analysis of the
data presented in the previous chapter and analyzes the
relation to key issues. The researcher has identified the
three key issues relating to the FPVO as: (1) applicability
of the FPVO; (2) the FPVO’s role in acquisition reform,
and; (3) barriers to implementation of the FPVO. 
B. ANALYSIS OF DATA
1.  Contract Type
 While there is a general desire to use FP type
contracts whenever possible, the responses indicate FP
vehicles should not be used where they are inappropriate.
To use a FP type contract requires the desired outcome to
be sufficiently defined so as to mitigate risk for all
parties involved. 
The Department of Defense, and the Navy in particular,
often cite the case of the A-12 program when discussing the
appropriateness of contract type. The A-12 program contract
was a fixed-price-incentive contract for what basically
amounted to a research and development effort. When
Northrop and Lockheed refused to agree to enter into a
fixed-price contract, the contract was awarded to McDonnell
Douglas and General Dynamics. McDonnell Douglas and General
Dynamics were led to believe competition existed and so
reduced their bids through two rounds of best and final
offers (Ref.7). Two years after award, the Navy was
notified the scheduled first flight would be significantly
delayed and the full-scale development effort would overrun
the ceiling price. The Navy was also informed not all
54
performance specifications could be met. Three years after
contract award, the Government terminated the A-12 contract
for default (Ref.1).
Seven years after the Government issued the
termination for default it was converted by a Court of
Claims ruling to a termination for convenience. The court
ordered the Government to pay McDonnell Douglas and General
Dynamics $3.877 billion on a contract originally expected
to cost $3.981 billion (Ref.1). No viable airplanes were
produced and the Government had little to show for this
incredible expense.
The striking failure of the A-12 program is sufficient
evidence for many in the acquisition field to avoid fixed-
price type contracts for anything but clearly defined or
otherwise low-risk acquisitions. This attitude is reflected
in the study participant’s responses. 
2.  Incongruence 
a. Research and Development versus All Comers
As Ms. Lee points out in her response to question
number six, we in Government acquisition use the FPVO
approach frequently in that we hire people at a fixed
salary without knowing with certainty what their output
will be. For example, the output (outcome) for GS-12s is
different for each just as each O-4 has a different level
of output. Of major difference between hiring and firing
practices and the acquisition of research and development
items is the magnitude of risk. Individual managers have
the ability to either closely supervise or not closely
supervise, they can assign co-workers to train and educate
new personnel and they can usually detect problems quickly
due to the close proximity of the manager and the
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workforce. In this environment, offering a fixed wage and
receiving a variable outcome is both anticipated and
reasonable, the reasonableness stemming from the manger’s
ability to assess and mitigate risk according to individual
need. 
Defense procurement, particularly research and
development for major weapon system acquisition, is not
conducive to the same oversight and periodic course
correction found in the management of personnel or in the
acquisition of common commercial goods and services.  The
risk inherent in attempting to transform a concept into a
tangible object must be recognized and valued so as to
determine the procurement method with the highest
possibility of success. In R&D acquisition the Government
is told to stay at “arms length” and the contractor seeks
to withhold information on costs and profit. There does not
exist the same hierarchy between Government and contractor
as is found in the employment scenario; the contractor is
working for the board of directors, not the Program Office. 
b. Outcome versus Expenditure
In her response to question five, Ms. Lee
compares Government expenditure of funds to how individuals
manage their own finances. Would an individual be willing
to give another money with no guarantee of the outcome? The
closest personal example is investing in the stock market
where returns on money invested are not guaranteed, yet
millions of people daily put money into stocks, mutual
funds and bonds. Presumably individuals who invest also
consider risk and manage that risk by allocating
investments across the risk spectrum. 
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This investment example is unique. Few if any
individuals would be willing to give money to a plumber who
can not assure he can repair a leak or give money to a
mechanic who cannot guarantee he will repair a car. In
general, individuals want to know the outcome before
opening their checkbooks. So too the Government wants to
know what it will be getting in exchange for millions or
billions of dollars paid out.  
3. Purported Benefits of the Fixed-price, Variable
Outcome Contract
a. Disengagement
One of the selling points of the FPVO is that it
will help to disengage the Government from the contractors.
If the FPVO can actually affect this disengagement, the
result should be less monitoring and oversight on the part
of the Government. Projecting further, less oversight would
mean less oversight infrastructure (less expense) for the
Government. The PBA report states the buying office has an
“affirmative obligation” to monitor progress and
performance-based payments could be used effectively in
conjunction with this monitoring (Ref.23, p.72). This is
contrary to the claim the FPVO contract will allow the
Government to disengage itself from the contractor and
monitor less.
The Government is unlikely to take a completely
hands-off approach for high-risk contracts, regardless of
contract type used. The hierarchical nature of our
Government requires information to flow up the hierarchy
and that flow of information increases in direct relation
to the priority and/or riskiness of the acquisition. This
information required to flow up is typically obtained from
Program Offices that must confer directly with contractors.
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In short, high-risk acquisitions will generally always
require a high degree of oversight and monitoring due to
the risk and expense involved. 
b. Increased Competition  
The FPVO contract was conceived of in part to
encourage traditionally non-Defense contractors to take
part in DoD acquisitions. The FPVO contract also requires
past-performance to be used as a key component of risk
mitigation. The Government has no past performance data for
defense acquisitions on traditionally non-Defense
contractors. This information could be obtained through
additional market research but the information obtained may
not be as robust the Government may wish (on the other
hand, it may be better). Relying upon past-performance data
between commercial firms may increase the three main
categories of risk and this increased risk may serve to
exclude the very contractors the FPVO contract was designed
to attract.
c. Multiple Award  
The FPVO concept also calls for multiple awards
to mitigate risk. Adding contractors increases the amount
of work necessary for acquisition planning, source
selection, contract administration and closeout. Multiple
awards increases the amount of administration required both
pre-award and post-award and may increase the number of
protests. While the “monitoring” function may decrease
under FPVO, it is very likely other components of the
contracting process may experience an increase in required
effort.
The PBA report also states the competitive aspect
will motivate competitors to “maximize its accomplishments
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particularly when there is a follow-on program and the
accomplishments of the FPVO contract will play a major role
in selecting the winner for the follow on effort.” As Ms.
Blake points out, this element may lead to problems
complying with CICA. 
d. Commercial Practices 
The PBA Team’s charter directed them to identify
actions required to make DoD acquisition more like
commercial industry (Ref.23, p.ES-3). One of the main
selling points of the FPVO concept is that it emulates
commercial business practice. To ascertain the validity of
this contention, the researcher interviewed Dr. Louis
Scarmoutzos of MVS Solutions, Inc. and Mr. Mike Kanze, CPM,
of Cornerstone Services (Refs.12,25). MVS Solutions, Inc.
is an “international consulting firm that provides
scientific, technical and business assistance to companies
and Government agencies (Ref.16)”; Cornerstone Services is
a management consulting firm (Ref.12). While the research
was by no means exhaustive, neither Dr. Scarmoutzos nor Mr.
Kanze had ever encountered a contractual arrangement with
the properties of the FPVO concept. 
When asked to describe a common or appropriate
contract type for R&D work, both interviewees described a
contract in which the payment is linked to milestones and
the level of compensation is based upon driving cost
factors (Refs.12,25). Dr. Scarmoutzos described a cost-
reimbursement scenario. Mr. Kanze stated compensation could
be based upon time, as in a time and materials contract, or
some other measure of effort expended by the contracted
firm. Mr. Kanze also stated some milestones could be fixed-
price if the outcome were determinable and a fair and
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reasonable cost could be calculated, while some milestones
that are not clearly definable should be on a cost-
reimbursement basis. This small sample of private industry
indicates the FPVO concept does not mirror general
commercial business practices for research and development.
4.  Satisfaction
In his response to question number eleven, Mr. Foley
states “the customer’s needs may be less satisfied.”
Satisfying the Government’s goals/desires is only possible
if the Government is able to adequately define those goals
and desires. If the Government is able to establish a range
of acceptable outcomes and the contractor provided an
outcome within that range, then the Government should be
satisfied. The researcher believes the Government would
have a great degree of difficulty determining a range of
acceptable outcomes. Even if a range were established, the
researcher believes the Government would be dissatisfied
unless the outcome at the top of the range was achieved. 
The current culture of Government acquisition is the
Government desires a specific outcome and for that outcome
will pay a certain amount of money. The hands-off nature of
the FPVO concept places the control of the outcome with the
contractor. The researcher believes the Government is
unwilling to relinquish the control of the outcome.
As the case of the A-12 indicates, there may very well
be a contractor willing to take on a high-risk fixed-price
contract. To many in the acquisition field, high-risk and
FP are like oil and water; the two do not and should not be
mixed. 
The researcher believes if the FPVO contract were
implemented some contractors will be found to accept a
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high-risk FP contract type. Contractors might then be
incentivized to mitigate their risk by building
contingencies into the contract, which is in direct
conflict with DoD acquisition policy. Building
contingencies into the contract would also increase overall
contract cost. The researcher further infers meeting the
other objectives of an FPVO acquisition (i.e. multiple
awards, competition, past performance) would be difficult
to satisfy, possibly increasing or shifting risk. The
result would be unintended consequences that are unknown at
this point.
C. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES
1. Applicability
One of the subsidiary research questions asks “What
are the prime applications for the FPVO in DoD
acquisitions? Is it more applicable to certain phases of
the acquisition process than to others?” Mr. Terry Little,
a key member of the PBA Study Group responsible for
developing the FPVO recommendation states the FPVO is
“applicable to demonstrations, design efforts, studies,
basic technology development, concept exploration.” Mr.
Little is essentially saying the FPVO contract type is
applicable to Phase A of the acquisition process. 
The FPVO concept is designed to align DoD with
commercial practices, encourage traditionally non-DoD
contractors to participate in DoD contracts and reduce risk
in the R&D/S&T phase for new technology and reduce risk for
other high-risk contracts. The research indicates the FPVO
concept would not do any of these well. The research also
indicates for every contrived scenario in which the FPVO
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could be used there is an existing contract type that will
meet the objective with less risk to the Government.
The FPVO was conceived of to mirror the way commercial
firms contract for S&T acquisitions. The PBA report does
not address whether or not a feasibility study was ever
conducted to discover if DoD could emulate commercial firms
under current regulations and restrictions. Commercial
firms are motivated by profit and loss and maximizing
shareholder value. Obtaining best value at reasonable cost
motivates the Government. Commercial firms can form long-
term relationships with each other; the Government must
comply with CICA. Agreements between commercial firms are
not subject to CAS disclosure, rather, they rely upon
boards of directors and the market economy to determine
legitimacy. Commercial firms do not have to satisfy the Buy
American Act or the Small Business Administration.
Commercial firms are simply not restricted in the way the
Government is restricted. These restrictions on the
Government make the ‘invisible hand’ of market forces less
efficient and sometimes totally ineffective. So the
question remains; can the Government be as efficient using
commercial practices as commercial industry given the
differences in motivation and restrictions? The researcher
thinks not. 
The risks involved in a CR vehicle and the FPVO are
essentially the same. Reduced oversight touted as a benefit
by the FPVO recommendation will only serve to increase
contractor profit margins and will not decrease Government
cost risk due to the Government’s culture of adding money
to programs until the desired result is achieved or funding
is withdrawn. Reduced infrastructure will never happen due
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to the need to maintain that infrastructure for CR type
contracts. (Ref.2)
All of the research participants display skepticism
toward using the FPVO concept in any situation. As
previously stated, these individuals are active reformers
and leaders in the field of acquisition. The fact that they
question the FPVO concept’s applicability in any situation
is noteworthy.
2. Role in Acquisition Reform
The FPVO concept was conceived to change the business
practices of DoD acquisition. The FPVO was designed to
allow DoD to mirror commercial S&T acquisition strategy, to
encourage a broader range of participants, to reduce the
cost risk of high-risk acquisitions and in general to be a
risk reduction vehicle. These are all noble aims and most
in acquisition would agree reform efforts should focus on
these areas. Is the FPVO contract the correct contract type
to accomplish these goals? The research demonstrates
implementation of the FPVO would, in fact, change practices
but would probably make the process worse off than before. 
Allowing the contractor to determine the final outcome of
an acquisition introduces a level of risk most program
managers, contracting officers, and other acquisition
decision makers will refuse to accept. The plausible range
of outcomes established by the Government will incentivize
contractors to control costs by aiming for the bottom of
the range. Even if an outcome in the range is not achieved
the contractor has no cause for concern as the FPVO
promises full payment regardless of the degree of success.
To determine whether or not the FPVO has a role in
acquisition reform we must first conclude if the reform is
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wanted and needed. As indicated by the research, there is a
desire to do a better job of selecting the appropriate
contract type and incentives based on the risk and type of
acquisition. There is no sustained imperative to do away
with cost-reimbursement contract types. 
Reform can begin at either the bottom or the top of an
organization. Reform emanating from the bottom is typically
spurred out of necessity as a way to allocate scarce
resources more efficiently. Reform from the top generally
stems from experts who have witnessed a pattern of
undesired behavior and wish to improve the process. Whether
generated by the many or the few, reform initiatives will
take hold if they are well-reasoned, practical, add value
to the process and are implemented with commitment on the
part of those involved. 
3.  Barriers
While there are no statutory or regulatory changes
necessary to use the FPVO in DoD acquisition, there are
numerous barriers preventing the recommendation’s adoption
by the acquisition community. Some of the barriers can be
overcome, as they have in previous reform efforts. Other
barriers unique to this particular recommendation are
insurmountable.
a. Culture
The culture of the acquisition workforce and its
resistance to change has been addressed in numerous
articles as has the oft experienced disconnect between
policy makers and those performing the actual work. While
this may be a barrier to overcome, it can and has been
overcome in the past (performance-based contracting as an
example). 
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Cultural resistance to change can be overcome by
publicity, training, regulatory changes and by practical
demonstration. The acquisition workforce will be quick to
adopt a reform initiative that either has proven it will
benefit them or has a good chance of benefiting them.
Champions are necessary to bring about cultural change. A
person who energetically promotes a change and manages the
implementation with intelligence and conviction will
receive much better results than will the promulgation of a
faceless directive. The culture and connectivity in
bringing about change should be thought of more as hurdles
than insurmountable barriers.
b.  Enthusiasm
The lack of enthusiasm for the FPVO concept by
leaders of both defense and commercial acquisition is also
a barrier to implementation. If the policy-makers and
trendsetters do not embrace a reform issue it is unlikely a
genuine effort will be made to implement a concept. To
change behavior from the top down ideas must be nurtured,
supported and demonstrated. Those doing the actual work
must receive sufficient guidance and training and be
rewarded for modifying their behavior through reasonable
incentives.
c.  Non-commerciality of Government/DoD
DoD is huge compared to even the largest of
corporations. Its sheer size brings with it management
challenges unheard of in the commercial sector. The
Government is not motivated by profit and loss nor must it
react to economic influences. What commercial enterprise
can rationalize deficit spending? What commercial
enterprise ignores the global economy when contracting for
Science & Technology and conducting Research & Development
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of new technology? What commercial enterprise must have
expenditures approved by a fractional legislative body
containing 535 members with distinct agendas? The
Government and DoD are unique and decidedly un-commercial. 
Government acquisition does not exist in
isolation. The acquisition process involves all three
branches of Government, numerous departments and agencies
and of course the commercial industry that supplies DoD’s
needs. Any initiative to adopt commercial practices that
focuses solely on acquisition and ignores the rest of the
players and processes will fail. To employ commercial-like
practices the rest of the Government and DoD must be
willing and able to become more commercial-like too.  
d. Interests, Incentives and Motivation 
Ancillary to the discussion of the differences
between the Government and the private sector is a
discussion of the primary interests, incentives and
motivating factors for each group. What drives the
Government? Government interests, incentives and motivating
factors are wide and varied, but essentially the Government
seeks to maintain individual property rights, promote the
economy and establish foreign and domestic policy that
benefits the majority of Americans. 
DoD takes its direction from the Government
through the National Military Strategy, Quadrennial Defense
Review and other key documents that prioritize the missions
of the Armed Services. The Armed Services then compare the
tools available to them to the missions they are required
to perform and develop requirements based upon the gaps
between tools necessary and tools currently available. DoD
is incentivized to procure the best possible tools so as to
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have the highest probability of meeting mission goals. DoD
is motivated to meet mission goals and is critiqued on how
well and how often it meets goals. DoD is interested in
protecting and satisfying the defense needs of the nation.
DoD is not interested, incentivized or motivated to
increase the wealth of American citizens.
Commercial firms competing in a global economy
have very different interests, incentives and motivating
factors. Commercial firms are interested in survival. To
survive, commercial firms must meet forecasted earnings
targets, maximize shareholder value and generate revenue.
Commercial firms are incentivized to become leaner so as to
enable competition, to be innovative, to be first to the
marketplace and to control costs so as to increase share
worth. 
The different interests, incentives and
motivating factors often create friction between DoD and
commercial industry. In the case of the FPVO concept, DoD
wants to invest in a program that will enable the Armed
Services to accomplish their mission while the contractor
wants to control costs to the maximum extent possible and
still supply the requirement. Provided DoD can successfully
establish a range of outcomes, the contractor will be
incentivized to satisfy the requirement at the lowest cost.
Once the Government establishes the range of outcomes, the
contractor has total control over the final outcome. The
contractor’s emphasis is on cost control. There is little
incentive to aim for the top of the performance range when
a less costly solution will presumably satisfy the
requirement. 
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This means under FPVO, DoD will likely receive an
outcome in the lowest part of the range, which may in fact
be less than desired, or in other words a sub-optimization.
The probability DoD would ratchet up the range so as to
achieve what they actually want is high. With “range creep”
DoD should anticipate “cost creep” as well.
e. Past Performance
The FPVO concept relies heavily upon multiple
awards and contractor past performance data to limit the
risk to the Government. How reasonable is this reliance? As
previously stated, multiple awards means duplicative effort
on the part of acquisition professionals. Instead of one
contract to award there are now three. Instead of one
contract to administer there are now four. What is the
contracting officer to do when only two or three companies
have bid and a multiple award is desired? He/she must
formulate a strategy to divide up the requirement so as to
limit the possibility of protest and legal proceedings.
Multiple awards also could mean an exponential increase in
the amount of protests and litigation experienced on
Government contracts and increased administrative costs.
Past performance is its own problem. Opening the
doors to non-traditional contractors will hopefully
generate healthy competition but might also increase risk.
The Government will likely have no current or relevant past
performance data on these non-traditional contractors. The
source selection process then would favor the traditional
defense contractors over the new entrants, and may
discourage new entrants from further participation. 
In the previous section the researcher suggests
contractors will be incentivized to aim for the least
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costly solution. Under the FPVO contract type, this means
contractors will consistently aim for the lower end of the
acceptable range of outcomes. How does one grade
contractors who meet the minimal requirement? Technically,
the contractor provides what the Government asks for and so
must be given high marks. In reality, the contractor may
consistently sub-optimize the outcome in an effort to
control costs. There may be a desire to exclude certain
contractors who consistently sub-optimize the outcome but
it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to justly
exclude a contractor who consistently sub-optimizes the
outcomes but provides goods or services within the
Government specified acceptable range. 
We must also consider how accurate is the
methodology for analyzing and applying past performance
data. There is no central database for past performance,
data are typically maintained locally by contracting
commands. For every past performance file there is likely a
different method for collecting data. How current and
reliable is the information? Is past performance a priority
at all commands or is it a task assigned to the newest
member with the least experience? How heavily is past
performance currently weighted in source selection? The
answers to these questions will vary from command to
command and contracting officer to contracting officer. 
The FPVO concept is propped up by the pillars of
multiple award and past performance. As I have shown,
multiple awards brings with it management challenges and




f. Risk and Control
I believe the most significant barrier to
implementation of the FPVO concept is risk management. The
FPVO concept is designed to limit Government risk and
apportion risk appropriately for S&T and other risk
reduction contracts. Does the FPVO actually do this? It
does not because the key decisions that lead to the outcome
are left in the hands of the contractor. 
The FPVO contract type allows a range of
plausible outcomes. Cost, schedule and performance risk may
actually increase beyond an acceptable level due to the
myriad solution sets possible. This increase in risk is due
to the fact that the contractor, not the Government,
ultimately selects the outcome from pre-approved
alternatives.
The Government may legitimately be able to
establish a range of outcomes that includes less than what
it wants. I do not think the Government would have the
trust and confidence in a contractor to provide S&T funds
and not want a full accounting of where those funds are
spent. I do not think the Government, in particular program
managers and service acquisition executives, would be
willing to allow the contractor to determine the final
outcome.
There is a direct correlation between control and
risk. The less control the Government maintains, the higher
the risk the outcome will be less than desired or not
materialize at all. In creating a situation in which the
Government has little control over the actions and
expenditures of the contractor, the FPVO introduces an
unacceptable level of risk into acquisition. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the research indicates lengthy
legislative proceedings to change laws and statutes are not
holding the FPVO concept recommendation back. The research
does indicate there is great reluctance on the part of
leaders in Government and civilian acquisition to embrace
the concept and actually use it in real procurement. This
reluctance is based upon the belief the FPVO contract will
increase the risk of high-risk procurements and result in
an increase in cost, outcome sub-optimization and program
failures.
The research also indicates the goals of the PBA Study
Group, relative to the FPVO recommendation, cannot be
arrived at through the creation and implementation of the
FPVO contract type. If the FPVO contract were to succeed in
attracting traditionally non-DoD contractors, the risk of
performance by those contractors potentially increases due
to lack of past performance data. Further, the research
indicates less oversight might be obtained but contractor
profit margins and overall cost might increase. Reduced
oversight for some number of contracts may not translate
into reduced infrastructure. The FPVO contract could have
detrimental unintended consequences.
Finally, the research indicates there is a general
desire to develop a fixed-price contract for R&D
(Refs.17,22) but there is no immediate need. There is,
however, an imperative to adequately and consistently match






This chapter analyzes the research data detailed in
Chapter III. The next chapter draws conclusions based upon
this analysis and offers sound recommendations to be used
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides sound conclusions and
recommendations to acquisition reformers and DoD
acquisition policy-makers with regard to the future of the
FPVO concept. This chapter will answer the question as to
whether the FPVO contract should be tested and implemented
or whether it is an idea that requires no further thought
or decision. This chapter will bridge the gulf of knowledge
that exists to permit decision makers to make an informed
decision. 
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. In its current form, the Fixed-price, Variable
Outcome contract type is inappropriate for use in
Department of Defense acquisition. 
The FPVO concept requires the Government to establish
a range of acceptable outcomes and then relinquish control
of outcome selection and execution to the contractor. This
loss of control introduces an unacceptable level of risk
into the equation. Additionally, there are many “ifs” that
must be satisfied such as “if” the Government can establish
a range, “if” the Government can live without cost
accounting, and “if” the contractor will put forth a
genuine best effort.
The FPVO concept would be successful in an optimal
scenario which includes a Government that can cogently
spell out its terms, a forthright contractor interested in
program success and satisfying the requirement, accurate
past performance data, the existence of motivating
incentives and competition. Rarely are all of these
elements optimized. More often, several or all of the
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elements are sub-optimized to some degree. The FPVO concept
requires perfect conditions to be an effective and useful
tool. Perfect conditions are not likely to occur.
The FPVO concept would not be the best option
available to contracting officers. For every scenario in
which the FPVO could be used, there is an existing contract
type that could also be used with less associated risk. The
risk is reduced through the Government’s ability to define
an outcome in the case of fixed-price contracts and through
oversight in the case of cost-reimbursement contracts. In
all FP and CR contract types currently available, the
Government maintains control over the final outcome. The
FPVO takes away the defined outcome, reduces oversight and
gives up control.  
2. The basic objectives of the FPVO concept are
still valid.
The objectives the FPVO contract was designed to
satisfy are valid and worth pursuing. The FPVO contract
seeks to increase industry participation in defense
contracting by reducing oversight and emulating commercial
business practices, reduce risk and in general increase the
likelihood the Government will have its requirements filled
using a fixed-price vehicle.
While the FPVO contract is unlikely to accomplish
these objectives, the objectives themselves are important
to the future of Government acquisition. 
3. DoD desires a fixed-price vehicle for S&T and
other high-risk acquisitions.
In a Department of Defense Inspector General
memorandum dated February 15, 2001 (Ref.17), the Director,
Defense Procurement is quoted stating her desire to
continue to look for a fixed-price contract type for R&D
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acquisition that establishes a fixed amount of funding and
requires the contractor to put forth a best effort. While
there is no imperative to satisfy an urgent need, it is
clear a fixed-price contract type that appropriately
manages risk for both parties is desired.
The ability to appropriately manage risk is central to
development of this desired contract type. The FPVO concept
will increase risk beyond an acceptable point and is
therefore not a prudent or feasible option. Any fixed-price
contract type for S&T and other high-risk acquisitions must
do a better job of apportioning and managing risk than the
CR alternative.
4. Cost as an Independent Variable has universal
applicability.
The CAIV philosophy is unrestricted in its use and
applicability. CAIV can be used in performance-based
service contracting, performance-based contracting, price-
based acquisition and across the spectrum of contract
types. CAIV has great utility in that is both forces and
allows the requiring agency and acquisition team to define
the requirement and make the tradeoffs. CAIV permits the
acquisition community to define and retain control over the
final outcome. This is in stark contrast to the FPVO
contract type in which the contractor decides the final
outcome.
CAIV is known well in some circles and not well-known
in others. Though it has been available for some time, CAIV
is not well-understood or widely implemented (Ref.27).
There is no section of the FAR devoted to CAIV. Guidelines
for conducting CAIV tradeoffs are not readily available.
CAIV is not yet on the syllabus of some institutions of
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higher learning. For CAIV to be understood and used it must
be spelled out, defined, publicized and its use
incentivized. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Abandon further discussion and effort on
implementation of the FPVO contract type.
This recommendation is supported by this thesis and a
DoD Inspector General memorandum asking the USD(AT&L) to
revoke the FPVO recommendation. USD(AT&L) concurred with
the recommendation to abandon the FPVO concept while
stating a fixed-price vehicle for S&T acquisition was still
desired (Ref.17).
2. Investigate the utility of a milestone-based
fixed-price instrument.
A fixed-price contract type for S&T and other high-
risk acquisitions is still desired by the USD(AT&L)
(Refs.17,22); therefore, exploration should not stop with
the demise of the FPVO concept. The controversy over the
FPVO concept centers on two main points, (1) the Government
pays the full amount regardless of outcome and (2) the
contractor determines the final outcome. A fixed-price
instrument that is milestone and level of effort driven may
be the answer to counter these problem areas.
  DoD contracting professionals already have the FP
LOE contract type at their disposal. Under the FP LOE,
payment is based upon the level of effort expended, rather
than the success of the outcome (Ref.6, p.337). In research
and development situations, the mistakes made are often as
important as the successes; making a level of effort
vehicle attractive to both parties. 
To satisfy DoD’s desire for a fixed-price contracting
instrument for R&D, the researcher recommends altering the
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FP LOE contract by increasing the dollar threshold and
making the payments both event and effort driven.
Increasing the threshold increases the applicability of the
FP LOE contract type. Adding event criteria, or milestones,
provides the Government with decision points at which it
can opt to continue or suspend funding. I call this
variation a Fixed-price, Level of Effort Milestone Decision
(FP LOE MD) contract (a sample FAR revision is provided in
Appendix G.).
As an example, let us say DoD wants to investigate the
possibility of bringing down enemy aircraft using an energy
pulse. This concept is radical and nothing like it has ever
been attempted. The Navy is assigned as the lead Service
and is given one million dollars for R&D. Under current
regulations, the Navy could contract for a feasibility
study using the FP LOE contract up to $100,000, or,
establish a fair and reasonable price and contract with a
company using a cost-reimbursement contract type.
Under the FP LOE MD decision, the Navy can contract
for a full R&D effort with one company, rather than a study
by one and then competitively bid further development. Key
milestones are established to provide the acquisition
community with decision points. These decision points not
only allow for decisions to continue funding or
cancellation, but also provide an opportunity to review
designs and make trade-off decisions. Each milestone has a
fixed-price ceiling. The contractor is eligible to receive
the full amount for that milestone provided his level of
effort supports payment. Contractors who reach the
milestone below the fixed-price ceiling are reimbursed for
their allowable and allocable expenses. 
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The FP LOE MD concept improves upon the FPVO concept
by paying the contractor for his actual effort, regardless
of success of failure, rather than paying him regardless of
any effort at all. The FP LOE MD satisfies the requirement
to take an incremental approach to R&D and recognizes
funding constraints. The FP LOE MD further improves upon
the FPVO concept by maintaining Government control over
trade-off decisions and the final outcome. 
3. Investigate the utility of a fixed-price vehicle
for R&D and other high-risk acquisitions based
upon the CAIV philosophy.
A second alternative to the FPVO concept is to develop
a contract type based upon the CAIV philosophy. CAIV
requires the requirement generator to determine a range of
outcomes, much like the FPVO. Unlike the FPVO, CAIV allows
the Government to retain control of the outcome. The CAIV
philosophy requires the requiring agency and the
acquisition team to make the decisions on the tradeoff
rather than the contractor as in the FPVO concept. CAIV
focuses on a cost objective, as does FPVO, but is does not
guarantee full payment without regard to degree of success. 
The CAIV philosophy has the potential to reduce risk
in high-risk acquisition by requiring the acquisition team
to define the outcome within the confines of cost. The CAIV
philosophy can be applied to FP and CR type contracts,
depending upon the level of outcome definition, risk
apportionment and incentives appropriate for the
acquisition. The CAIV philosophy mirrors best commercial
practices and therefore may encourage non-traditional
offerors. The CAIV philosophy is already in use and does
not require regulatory or statutory changes.  
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The CAIV philosophy has the potential of developing
into a crossover contract type, i.e. it could be fixed-
price or cost-reimbursement, depending upon the situation. 
4. DoD acquisition should explore the development of
Decision Support Software to aid contracting
professionals in selecting the correct contract
type and incentives based upon the properties of
individual acquisitions.
One of the continuing themes from the responses to the
research question was the acquisition workforce needs to do
a better, more consistent job of selecting contract type
and incentives. A decision support system aids the decision
maker in correctly selecting from options available based
upon inputs. In the case of selecting contract type, the
contracting team would benefit from a computer program that
recommends contract type and incentives with the highest
probability of success based upon risk, contractor past
performance, state of technology, etc.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is the FPVO contract type?
The Fixed-price, Variable Outcome contract type
establishes a firm-fixed-price for a product or service
that cannot be well-defined or is chosen not to be well-
defined. The requiring activity generates a range of
outcomes that are both plausible and acceptable to them.
The contractor puts forth its best effort to deliver a
product or service within the defined range but if
unsuccessful for whatever reason (barring criminal
activity) still receives 100% of the fixed-price. It is
important to note the contractor determines the outcome
under the FPVO contract based upon funding and the range
established.
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2. How is the FPVO the same, similar and or
different from the following:
a. Firm-fixed-price contracts
b. Firm-fixed-price, Level of Effort contracts
c. Cost-reimbursement contracts
d. Time and Materials contracts
e. Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV)
The FPVO contract was developed to replace cost-
reimbursement contracts in many research and development
acquisitions. It is similar to FFP and FP LOE in that a
firm-fixed-price is established for the effort. It is
similar to CR contracts in that the contractor’s best
effort is required (also true for FP LOE). As with the Time
and Materials contract type, the FPVO contract possesses
elements of both FP and CR contracts and is therefore
something of a hybrid. Cost as an Independent Variable is
included to show the objectives of the FPVO contract exist
outside the contracting arena an have become corporate
philosophy in major weapon system acquisition.  
3. What are the prime applications for the FPVO in
DoD acquisition?
The research shows and the researcher concludes the
FPVO is not applicable to DoD acquisition. The FPVO concept
increases the risk of program failure by reducing oversight
and relinquishing control of the outcome.
4. What are the conditions necessary for its use?
The FPVO concept requires a broad range of optimal
conditions for it to be used effectively. The optimal
conditions required are unlikely to ever occur.
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5. What specific recommendations can be made to
foster implementation and use?
The FPVO should not be used for any DoD acquisition in
its current form. The risk introduced by permitting the
contractor to determine the outcome is too great to
overcome. 
The FPVO concept is not the appropriate contract
vehicle for S&T and other high-risk acquisitions. This does
not mean a fixed-price vehicle for S&T and other high-risk
acquisitions cannot exist. The researcher has suggested two
possible alternatives.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Investigation of FP LOE
In its current state, the FP LOE contract type has
many restrictions to its use and is therefore seldom used.
A possible research topic is to validate the continued need
for the FP LOE contract.
2. The Fixed-price, Level of Effort Milestone
Decision Contract
This contract type is offered as an alternative to the
FPVO contract. A genuine opportunity exists to further
explore and develop this recommendation and determine its
applicability and its effect on risk.
3. A Cost as an Independent Variable-based Contract 
A second opportunity exists to develop a contract type
designed to effectively manage the risk of R&D/S&T or other
high-risk acquisitions. The researcher suggests a contract
type based upon the CAIV philosophy that is fixed-price in
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
The following list of acronyms is provided for a
common frame of reference. The acronyms were obtained from
basic acquisition and contract literature and regulations.
AAAV – Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle
CAIV – Cost As an Independent Variable
CAS – Cost Accounting Standards
CICA – Competition In Contracting Act
CR – Cost reimbursement
DAWIA – Defense Workforce Improvement Act
DFAR – Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
DoD – Department of Defense
FARA – Federal Acquisition Reform Act
FASA – Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
FP – Fixed-price
FFP – Firm-fixed-price
FP LOE – Fixed-price, Level Of Effort 
FPVO – Fixed-price, Variable Outcome
GAAP – Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
JDAM – Joint Direct Attack Munition
PBA – Price-based Acquisitions
R&D – Research and Development
S&T - Science and Technology
TINA – Truth In Negotiations Act
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T&M – Time and Materials
UAODS – Unmanned Air Ordnance Delivery System
USD(AT&L) – Office of Under Secretary of Defense for










APPENDIX B. PBA REPORT FPVO EXAMPLES 
Fixed-price, Variable Outcome 
Example 1 
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Program 
 
In 1991, the Air Force competitively awarded two contracts for the Preliminary 
Design and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) 
Program –an ACAT 1D program to develop a guidance package to improve the accuracy 
of dumb bombs. The two winning contractors (Lockheed-Martin and McDonnell-
Douglas) were to work in parallel over a period of approximately 18 months to do risk 
reduction and manufacturing development. There were two primary goals. The first was 
to reduce risk sufficiently to allow entry into a moderate-risk Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. The second, equally important goal was to 
mature the design and develop the manufacturing processes so that the two contractors 
could offer firm-fixed-price bids for the first two production lots, as well as non-binding 
production price commitment curves for the following three lots. Each contractor 
proposed its Statement of Work. The two contracts were cost plus fixed fee. Prior to the 
award all competitors understood informally that the Air Force planned to allocate no 
more than $40M per contract. After award both winners received the criteria the Air 
Force planned to use for the EMD down select. 
The JDAM PDRR, as well as most similar risk reduction programs, was a perfect 
candidate for a Fixed-price, Variable Outcome contract. First, the objectives allowed 
substantial leeway in what the contractor had to do to satisfy them. The statements of 
work were essentially plans of what the contractor intended to accomplish. Second, the 
“carrot,” potential for future work, was sufficient motivation to preclude either contractor 
from a half-hearted or wasteful effort. Third, the $40M was a firm ceiling. Practically 
speaking, the Air Force had no money to fund an overrun beyond $40M. One down select 
criterion for EMD was cost control during PDRR. This made the likelihood of any 








The Army has a number of field radios awaiting repair at the original 
manufacturer, a commercial company. There is no prior repair history on these radios. 
The Army did not buy data that would allow a competitive repair contract. Based upon 
previous repair costs for similar radios, the Army estimates it has enough money to repair 
from 50-75% of the radios. Ordinarily, the Army would contract for the repairs using a 
time and materials (cost reimbursable) contract. In this case, the Army decides to use a 
Fixed-price, Variable Outcome contract. It proposes to give the contractor $2M plus an 
incentive of $500 for every radio the contractor returns to serviceable status. The 
contractor accepts. Both the Army and the contractor are pleased with the results. 
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Do you think there is a genuine desire to move away from cost reimbursement 
contract types whenever possible?  
 
2. How often is the availability of funds the defining factor in procurement? 
 
3. How often is funding cut or withdrawn from cost reimbursement acquisitions? 
 
4. The FPVO contract type was recommended as a contracting reform initiative in 
1999. Why do you think it was never acted upon? Why do you think acquisition 
initiatives in general are difficult to implement? 
 
5. Had you ever heard of the FPVO before? If so, what was your exposure to the 
concept? 
 
6. Do you have a contract now or have you had a contract in the past where the 
FPVO would have been applicable and its use desired? If so, what was the nature 
of the procurement? 
 
7. Do you think the FPVO could be used successfully in performance-based 
contracting and performance-based service contracting? If not, why not? 
 
8. Do you think the FPVO would require more Government monitoring than cost 
reimbursement type contracts, the same amount, or less monitoring? 
 
9. What incentives do you think are required for the FPVO to be used successfully 
(provided you think it can be used successfully)? Performance-based payments, 
competition and hope of future contracts were suggested in the PBA report. 
 
10. What rules, regulations and/or statutes would need to change to successfully begin 
using the FPVO throughout the DoD acquisition community? 
 
11. The three scenarios are examples of procurements in which it is suggested the 
FPVO should be used in place of cost reimbursement contract types or other fixed 
price contracts. If the FPVO were an option, would you use it in these or similar 
acquisitions? If not, please state reasons why. 
 
12. Do you think a contractor and the Government could agree upon a fixed-price for 
these types of procurements? 
 





14. How effectively do you think the FPVO would mitigate cost and performance risk 
in the three scenarios? 
 
15. Do you think the contractor’s best effort would satisfy the Government’s 
goals/desires? 
 
16. What do you perceive are the strengths and weaknesses of the FPVO? 
 
17. One of the purported benefits of the FPVO is when used with an incremental 
approach for R&D, it affords both the Government and the contractor to limit 
time and capital investment by offering a “go-no go” decision points at the early 
stages of development.  Please comment on this purported benefit.  
 
18. One of the criticisms of the FPVO is the contractor could take the money and do 
nothing (or expend little effort and still get the full amount) – please comment on 
this criticism. 
 
19. One of the advantages of the FPVO is the fixed-price eliminates the baggage that 
comes with cost reimbursement contracts such as auditors, checkers, etc. Do you 
think this is true? If true, is this a good thing? 
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APPENDIX D. THE SCENARIOS 
EXAMPLE 1 
DESIGN STUDY OF UNMANNED AIR ORDINANCE 
DELIVERY SYSTEM (UAODS) 
Scenario: 
 
NAVAIR is looking for a design for a new remotely piloted vehicle that can 
deliver ordnance to a target over the horizon. To accomplish their goal, NAVAIR will 
contract with two firms to produce a vehicle design.  
 
NAVAIR spells out some of the basic requirements such as range, maximum 
altitude, targeting system, etc. The competing firms are each given $1.5 million to come 
up with a design.  The deliverables are a design, a mock-up and a report with executive 
summary. 
 
NAVAIR hopes to use the best design as the basis for the new vehicle. The 
incentive for the contractors to put forth their best effort is a) the hope of a follow on 
contract for production of the vehicles and b) they are in competition. Past performance 
was heavily weighted in the source selection process. 
 
If neither of the designs proves cost effective or not feasible for other reasons, 
NAVAIR will pay both contractors the full promised amount and shelve the reports. 
 
EXAMPLE 2 
CONTRACT FOR USS INCHON (MCS-12) PIERSIDE 
RESTRICTED AVAILABILITY (PRAV) 
Scenario: 
 
 The USS INCHON (MCS-12) is an older ship in need of repair. Several 
other ships have run aground earlier in the year and the Surface Forces Atlantic 
(SURFLANT) repair budget has been greatly diminished to meet these unexpected 
expenses.  The USS INCHON has a long list of items that need attention but some are 
more critical than others. INCHON Engineering Department personnel and the ship’s 
Port Engineer have prioritized the work that needs to be done. 
 
SURFLANT is able to scrape together $700,000 for repairs. They contract with 
Generic Shipyard, Inc. to fix as many items on the list as possible beginning with the 
highest priority items. SURFLANT and the ship will be satisfied with whatever can be 










You are the contracting officer for a major weapon system procurement. You 
know extensive market research is required but you have realized your command does 
not have the available manpower to conduct market research for your program and 
continue with other business. You decide to hire consultants to provide the information 
you require. 
 
As this is a shaping up to be a $3B procurement, you know the value of good 
market research is key to the success of the acquisition. You contract with two different 
consulting firms to collect, organize and present the data.  Each firm will receive 
$300,000 for their efforts regardless of the quality of product delivered. Past performance 
was heavily weighted in the source selection process. 
 
You may decide to use only one report, you may use both, or you may use neither 
and be required to hire a third, different firm. Regardless of what you decide, the 
consulting firms will receive full payment. Their incentives are a) the hope for additional 
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APPENDIX F. FAR REVISION FOR FPVO 
16.208 Fixed-Price, Variable 
Outcome contract. (No Text) 
16.208-1 Description. 
 A Fixed-Price, Variable 
Outcome (FPVO) contract provides for a 
price that is not subject to any adjustment on 
the basis of the contractor’s cost experience 
in performing the contract. This contract 
type allows for a range of possible outcomes 
rather than one definitive outcome. The 
possible acceptable outcomes must be 
determined prior to award. This contract 
type places on the contractor maximum risk 
and full responsibility for all costs and 
resulting profit or loss. It provides maximum 
incentive for the contractor to control costs 
and perform effectively.  
16.208-2 Application. 
 The FPVO contract is 
suitable for acquiring commercial goods and 
services, Research and Development and 
other high-risk acquisitions when the need is 
not clearly defined and— 
 (a) The dollar value of the 
acquisition cannot be exceeded; 
 (b) It is known or suspected 
the cost of all repairs will exceed the funds 
allocated; 
 (c) There is a clearly defined 
range of acceptable outcomes; 
 (d) There is adequate price 
competition; 
 (e) There are reasonable price 
comparisons; 
 (f) Available cost or pricing 
information permits realistic estimates of 
probable costs of performance; and 
 (g) The contractor agrees to 
accept the performance risk associated with 





 The FPVO shall not be used 
when there is only one desired and 
acceptable outcome. It shall not be used 
when scope growth and commensurate 
funding increases are anticipated.  
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APPENDIX G. FAR REVISION FOR FP LOE MD 
16.208 Fixed-price, level-of-effort 
Milestone Decision contract. (No Text) 
16.208-1 Description. 
A fixed-Price, level-of-effort 
Milestone Decision requires- 
(a) The contractor to 
provide a specified level of effort, over a 
stated period of time, on work that can be 
stated only in general terms; and 
(b) The Government to 
pay the contractor based upon effort 




effort milestone decision term contract is 
suitable for specific research and 
development efforts. The outcome(s) is(are) 
to be logically broken down into milestone 
events. The objective of the contractor is to 
meet the criteria of the milestones.  
The Government is to work 
with the contractor(s) to establish the 
milestones. Each milestone provides the 
Government an opportunity to review the 
progress of the effort and gauge the degree 
of future success. At each milestone review, 
the Government has the opportunity to 
continue or suspend further funding. The 
Government and contractor(s) are to conduct 
milestone reviews and discuss performance, 
cost and schedule trade-offs prior to 
continuance. 
Payment is based upon level of effort 
and milestone accomplishment. Each 
milestone will have a fixed-price associated 
with it; actual payment may be less than the 
fixed-price based upon contractor effort but 
may not exceed the fixed-price. 
16.208-3 Limitations. 
This contract type may be 
used only when- 
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(a) The work required 
cannot be otherwise clearly defined; 
(b) The required level of 
effort is identified and can be agreed 
upon in advance; 
(c) The project can be 
broken down into logical milestone 
events; and 
(d) The contract price is 
$1,000,000 or less. 
97
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. A-12 Avenger Program History, www.abs.net
2. Anonymous source.
3. Blair, Dennis, Commander in Chief Pacific Command,
quoted in Federal Computer Week article written by
Christopher J. Dorobek, January 2002.
4. Blake, Judith, Senior Procurement Analyst,
Headquarters Department of the Army, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition Logistics
and Technology, Acquisition Reform Directorate,
survey. 
5. Contract Pricing Reference Guides
6. Federal Acquisition Regulation 
7. Fenster, Herbert, The A-12 Legacy, It Wasn’t an
Airplane-It Was a Train Wreck, Proceedings, February
1999
8. Ferlise, Victor, Army Reform Effort Bears Fruit, AR
Today, Vol.3 No. 5, Sept/Oct 1998
9. Foley, Richard, Vice President – Contracts, Raytheon
Company, survey.
10. Fuhs, James W., How The Implementation of Performance
Based Contracting Has Affected Program Management
Within The Department of Defense, Master’s Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December
1998.
98
11. Harshbarger, Eugene, RADM (Ret), USN, Director
Acquisition Policy, Northrop-Grumman Ship Systems,
survey.
12. Kanze, Michael, CPM, President and Chief Executive
Officer Cornerstone Services, telephone interview.
13. Lamm, Dr. David V., Academic Associate, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, classroom
instruction.
14. Lee, Deidre, Director, Defense Procurement, Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics), telephone interview. 
15. Little, Terry R., Program Director of the Joint Air-
to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) Joint Program
Office and Member, Price-based Acquisition Study
Group, survey and telephone interview.
16. MVS Solution, Inc. Homepage, www.mvssolutions.com 
17. Office of the Department of Defense Inspector General,
Audit on Use of Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 12
Contracts for Applied Research—Report No.D-2001-051,
February 2001.
18. Office of Secretary Of Defense, Section 912 Report to
Congress, April 1998.
19. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Reform web site, ACQWeb,
www.acq.osd.mil/ar/
20. Office of the Under Secretary for Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Memorandum
For The Secretaries of the Military Departments,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretary
99
of Defense (Comptroller), Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence), General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, Inspector General of the Department of
Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Director,
Defense Contract Audit Agency, Director, Defense
Finance and Accounting Service, Director, Defense
Logistics Agency, Subject: Establishment of a Study
Group to Analyze Implementation of Price-Based
Acquisition within the Department of Defense, October
1998.
21. Office of the Under Secretary for Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Memorandum
For Secretaries of the Military Departments, Director,
Defense Research and Engineering, Directors of Defense
Agencies, Subject: Contractor Cost Sharing. Summary:
Memorandum prohibits requiring contractor investment
in defense Research and Development contracts. May
2001.
22. Office of the Under Secretary for Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Memorandum for
Component Acquisition Executives, Subject: Contracting
for Applied Research, August 2001.
23. Office of the Under Secretary for Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Report of
Price-based Acquisition Study Group, November 1999.
24. Parry, D. Scott, Corporate Director, Contract Policy,
Lockheed Martin Corporation, survey.
100
25. Scarmoutzos, Dr. Louis M., President and Chief
Executive Officer MVS Solutions, Inc., telephone
interview.
26. Yoder, Elliot C., CDR, SC, USN, Lecturer, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, classroom
instruction.






INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. CDR E. Cory Yoder 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
4. Professor David V. Lamm 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
5. Deidre Lee 
Director of Defense Procurement OUSD(AT&L) 
 Washington, DC  
 
6. Terry Little 
Program Director, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile Joint Program Office 
Eglin AFB, Florida 
 
7. Judith Blake 
HQDA, OASA(ALT) SAAL-PR 
Acquisition Reform Directorate 
Falls Church, Virginia  
 
8. Richard Foley 
Raytheon Company 
 Lexington, Massachusetts  
 
9. Eugene Harshbarger, RADM(Ret) USN 
 Northrop-Grumman Ship Systems 
Arlington, Virginia  
 
10. Scott Parry 
Lockheed Martin Corporation 
 Bethesda, Maryland  
 
11. LCDR Thomas S. Armstrong SC,USN 
 Monterey, California  
